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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to ascertain whether the 
military material culture used in the American Revolution by 
soldiers of Virginia reflects societal attitudes toward war.
The equipment used by the Virginia soldier is 
determined through the records of the Williamsburg and 
Philadelphia Public Stores and other primary sources. 
Selected secondary sources are also used.
Collector's guides and other works illustrating the 
military material culture were consulted. Examples from 
these works were matched to the descriptions of equipment 
used by the Virginians. These examples comprised the data 
for analysis and interpretation.
Individual attributes of selected examples of the 
military equipment were compared and contrasted with similar 
features of British and other European equipment. This was 
integrated into assumptions concerning state militarism, 
societal attitudes about war, and how it would be reflected 
in a society's military material culture.
vii
THE EQUIPMENT OF THE VIRGINIA SOLDIER IN THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION
Introduction
Military forces in every age reflect the societies 
they are created to defend (Louis Morton, in 
Glatthaar 1985:xiii).
Dr. Glatthaar supports the statement quoted above with 
a review of the actions and personal writings of the men of 
the Federal army that marched from Atlanta to Savannah, 
Georgia and into the Carolinas under William Sherman during 
the final year of the American Civil War. If the theory is 
correct, and Glatthaar's work advances an argument that it 
is, then this should be true for the military forces of 
other periods of American history. Also, if material 
culture produced and used by a society reflects that 
society, then the material culture used by the military 
forces would serve as an insight into that society.
A general hypothesis of this study, and perhaps of all 
material culture studies, is that material culture reflects 
characteristics of the society that produced and used 
particular artifacts. This study will concentrate on a more 
specific hypothesis: that the equipment of the soldier 
reflects the attitude of his society toward war. The 
artifacts to be studied are those that constitute the 
equipment used by the soldier, recruited by the state of 
Virginia, who served with the Continental Army during the
2
3American Revolution, 1775-1783. It is assumed that these 
artifacts will, taken as a whole, suggest social attitudes 
concerning the conflict of which they were a part. This 
will, of course, view a particular social group at a 
particular point in time. Yet, if the results of this goal 
are creditable, then perhaps further reflection might be 
possible into attitudes that may have continued through 
time.
This study will not provide a quantitative analysis of 
the military material culture of the American Revolution. 
These artifacts, with sufficient documentation, do not exist 
in the quantities necessary to allow statistical 
manipulation. Although it can be established through 
documentary sources that a particular type of item was used, 
there may be only one example of this item in existence.
The problem of the lack of repetitive examples will be 
compensated by examining the total group of artifacts.
The lack of a quantitative analysis will make this 
study more art than science. However, material culture 
study is a relatively new mode of inquiry; and if it serves 
no other purpose, this study may produce further questions 
concerning the artifacts involved or the method. Material 
culture studies combines many disciplines. Thomas Schlereth 
in describing the current state of material culture studies 
uses the term "missionary effort" (Schlereth 1982:xiv).
This study can be considered part of this effort. This 
study also attempts to respond to another point made by
4Schlereth.
I feel very strongly, however, that research on 
artifacts and the American past must move beyond the 
merely descriptive stage of investigation into the 
more problematic area of historical analysis and 
interpretation (Schlereth 1980:5).
The words, "historical analysis and interpretation" 
demonstrates Schlereth*s bias in material culture studies. 
He is very clear about his use of artifacts. "I view the 
study of artifacts and the American past as a thoroughly 
historical study and, hence, a totally humanistic 
enterprise" (Schlereth 1980:3). However, he does not 
suggest that history is the only discipline that uses 
artifacts in cultural studies. He notes contributions from 
subfields "such as history of technology, folklife studies, 
cultural anthropology, historical archeology, cultural 
geography, and art history" (Schlereth 1982:xiii).
Schlereth acknowledges a debt to archeologist James
Deetz for providing a broad definition of material culture
that has had an affect on his view of material culture.
Deetz would have material culture include:
"... cuts of meat as material culture since there 
are many ways to dress an animal, plowed fields, 
even the horse that pulls the plow, since scientific 
breeding of livestock involves the conscious 
modification of an animal's form according to 
culturally derived ideals. Our body," argues Deetz, 
"itself is a part of our physical environment, so 
that such things as parades, dancing and all aspects 
of kinesics-human motion-fit within our definition.
Nor is the definition limited only to matter in the 
solid state. Fountains are liquid examples, as are 
lily ponds, and material that is partly gas includes 
hot air balloons and neon signs". Deetz has also 
suggested, in Invitation to Archaeology, that even 
language is part of material culture, a prime
5example of its gaseous state. Words, after all, are 
air masses shaped by speech apparatus according to 
culturally acquired rules (Schlereth 1980:3).
The many subfields mentioned by Schlereth and the
substantial credit he gives Deetz suggests that the many
disciplines that study artifacts within their particular
theoretical and methodological sphere are bound, and perhaps
interwoven, by the use of material culture. This study
borrows from anthropology and history. This combination is
not incompatible. Deetz recognizes this compatibility in
historical archeology.
... the documentary record and the archeological 
record compliment each other (Deetz 1977:8).
... there are factors at work on form and function 
of the artifacts of the past that are beyond 
recovery, either by logic, hypothesis and deduction, 
or endless guessing. They are available, however, 
to the historical archeologist if intelligent and 
imaginative use is made of the rich supporting 
materials, and at least can serve as a suggestion of 
a more diverse set of factors than have been 
heretofore considered in prehistory (Deetz 1977:23).
This is not to suggest that historical documentation is
a panacea for all problems faced by a researcher in
historical archeology or any discipline. Stanley South sees
pitfalls in excessive reliance on documentary evidence.
As archeologists we must depend on our archeological 
tools for interpretive statements of archeological 
data, and not resort to the easy expedient of 
superimposing the historical preconceptions onto the 
archeological record. We do, of course, use both 
the archeological and historical data, but we should 
not use history as an interpretive crutch to prop up 
statements purporting to be archeological in nature.
If we develop such habits, and then find ourselves 
in a situation where there is no documentation to 
lean on, we may well find that our archeological 
tool kit is empty, or that we do not have the skills
6to use the tools we have available. Such a lean-on- 
the-arms-of-history approach is rendering a 
disservice to archeology by not utilizing to the 
fullest the information manifest in the surviving 
patterned material remains of culture from both 
history and archeology.
There is apparently an assumption in historic site 
archeology that archeological data must have a 
direct historical counterpart. There is, of course, 
nothing wrong with archeological-historical 
connections, but this is not the primary goal for 
the archeologist. As archeologists we are dealing 
primarily with patterned material remains of past 
behavior, with the processes responsible for that 
behavior not necessary recognized by the people or 
the society in the system from which the pattern 
emerged (South 1977:326).
Although Deetz appears a bit more enthusiastic about 
the use of documentation than does South, their statements 
are not in opposition. Each advocates a balance in the use
of historical documentation. However, that balance may be
individual to the researcher. The relationship of the 
historical record to the material culture used for this 
study is critical. Although not as rigorous, or even 
similar, to South's method, this study depends on pattern 
recognition. This exercise might not be possible if limited 
to materials available through archeological excavations. 
Remnants of firearms, buttons, glass, gun flints, buckles, 
and perhaps some tin would be the result of excavation. 
Spatial and temporal patterns may be observed, especially in 
winter camps, but the armies were, for the most part,
transient. A winter camp would have a duration of
approximately five months. Distribution patterns would be 
limited.
7Pattern recognition of attributes, the basis of this 
study, may well be possible from an archeological 
assemblage. Yet, the inclusion of material that would 
probably be missing, notably clothing, will strengthen the 
final analysis and interpretation. The bulk of the 
documentation used for this study deals primarily with 
clothing. Clothing is as illustrative as other categories 
of military equipment; and since it did not survive below, 
or above, the ground, historical documentation is the only 
avenue to the inclusion of this item.
South's warning concerning the possible negative affect 
of historical documentation on the archeological tool kit is 
applicable to a broader anthropological perspective. The 
use of historical documentation in this study does not 
violate this concern. The primary use of historical 
materials is to establish the material culture base for the 
study. The identification of patterns in the material 
culture is a result of observation, not historical 
reference.
The conclusions of this study will draw upon subjective 
works of scholars which have a direct or indirect bearing on 
the analysis and interpretation of the material culture. 
Apparently, there are no similar examinations of American 
military material culture. Previous works have been limited 
to histories highlighting technological change or simply 
cataloging the equipment of a particular category or time 
period. This study attempts to relate, in an elementary
8way, a societal attitude about armed conflict through the 
material culture associated with that activity.
The relationship of the military equipment to the 
attitudes of the society would probably not be recognized by 
the society. Also, this relationship is not independent of 
other cultural forces which, in part, helped determine the 
equipment used by the Virginia soldier. These forces are 
numerous and their relationship complex; therefore, the 
examination of this larger view will be limited to economics 
and religion, two of the most powerful forces shaping the 
period of the American Revolution.
The economic condition of the United States at the 
beginning of the Revolution required the Americans to seek 
assistance from European nations. The United States was not 
a poor country, but its wealth was in raw materials and 
agricultural commodities. It suffered from lack of 
manufacturing resources and cash.
Representatives of the individual colonies and the 
national government went to Europe to obtain assistance. 
Recognition of the new nation and military alliances were 
slow to develop but financial assistance was awaiting their 
arrival.
Before a single patriot commissioner reached Paris,
Louis XVI directed that one million livres be 
extended to Caron de Beaumarchais, playwright, poet, 
darling of the salons, sometime secret agent. 
Beaumarchais, working with Vergennes, played a part 
in influencing the King, even to proposing the form 
that clandestine support would take: creation of a 
fictitious mercantile firm, Roderique, Hortalez and 
Company, actually Beaumarchais himself, who would
9spend the million livres to buy munitions for the 
Americans, from French arsenals. Spain promptly 
advanced a like sum, and the next year France 
repeated her initial contribution (Higginbotham 
1971:233).
The focus of this aid has often been French muskets. 
Although they were welcome, especially as they provided 
uniformity which eased problems in ammunition supply.
Muskets were not the highest priority item.
The muskets arrived in quantity in 1777. The 
Continental Army fought numerous major battles, Lexington, 
Breed's/Bunker Hill, New York City, Trenton, prior to 
obtaining French muskets. The need for personal protection 
on the frontier, as well as hunting, had established a 
tradition of personal ownership of firearms and a firearms 
manufacturing industry in America prior to the Revolution. 
Although colonial firearms makers could not meet the initial 
wartime need, American gunsmiths did contribute to the war 
effort by repairing firearms, as well as limited production.
There was, however, a need for gunpowder. This, along 
with salt, was the most needed item from abroad (Herndon 
1981:17). Approximately 90% of the powder used by the 
Americans in the Revolution was imported (Neumann and Kravic 
1975:132). The importance of this commodity is demonstrated 
by Virginia's first crisis of the Revolution. The reaction 
to Lord Dunmore1s order to seize the colony's supply of 
gunpowder caused the Royal Governor to leave Williamsburg 
and seek the safety of a British warship (Goodwin 1962:3). 
The reliance on imported gunpowder may well have resulted in
10
shortages at times. An order given on August 23, 1779, 
instructs the soldiers to lay their cartridges on blankets 
in the sun to dry (Gamble 1892:233).
Virginia's imports included firearms during the early 
part of the Revolution. By August 1777, however, the need 
for firearms and ammunition had been met and cotton and wool 
cards, clothing, rum, and sugar were high priorities. Salt 
continued to be imported throughout the war (Herndon 
1981: 21, 23) .
The importation of cotton and wool cards suggests an 
attempt by Virginia to produce textiles. The Williamsburg 
Public Store records of this period (August-September 1777) 
shows the early war practice of issuing cloth, as well as 
clothing, continued (Goodwin 1962:132-137). It is difficult 
to determine if the clothing or cloth was imported or 
locally manufactured. It would appear, however, that the 
cloth was available in larger quantities than prepared 
clothing. This may be a result of cost or other market 
forces. It is possible that the importation of cloth rather 
than clothing was due to the desire of the Virginians to 
control the form of the end product. The reasons for this 
are discussed below.
The need of the Army for foreign goods is somewhat 
confused by the power of the government to control 
purchasing and distribution and the actions of the soldiers 
themselves.
The army's needs and the difficulty of importing
11
from Europe made cloth and clothing scarce and 
expensive. The symbolic patriotic homespun did not 
appear in sufficient quantity to end the shortage 
[Valley Forge, 1777-1778]. Despite the occasional 
charitable contributions of clothing to the army, 
civilians most often competed with soldiers for 
clothing. Money often determined which group won 
the competition, and the army frequently lost.
Soldiers who sought money for food or liquor sold 
their clothing and even their muskets to civilians - 
in violation of both state laws and military orders.
A newspaper writer asked, "How can it be, that any 
and every individual, can purchase shirts, 
stockings, shoes, etc. and the vulture-eyed agents, 
etc. be unable to purchase for the soldiery"
(Royster 1979:192).
The lack of control over the economy caused Benjamin 
Franklin to wonder why Congressional credit was being used 
to pay for tea, gewgaws, and superfluities while funds for 
arms and ammunition were difficult to find (Royster 
1979:271). The answer is, of course, that the market was 
supplying individuals with the ability to pay, rather than 
the Continental Congress or state governments where payment 
was made with paper money of questionable value.
The economic problems were somewhat mitigated by the 
belief in the Revolution. The patriotism of the Americans 
had a strong religious component. This had an impact on the 
form of the material culture of the period.
Historian Edmund S. Morgan states that religious
beliefs had a primary affect on the American Revolution.
Without pretending to explain the whole variety of 
the Revolution, I should like to suggest that the 
movement in all its phases, from the resistance 
against Parliamentary taxation in the 1760's to the 
establishment of a national government and national 
policies in the 1790's Was affected, not to say 
guided, by a set of values inherited from the age of 
Puritanism (Morgan 1968:23 6).
12
Morgan interprets the Puritan Ethic as a value system 
based on every man being called by God to serve Him, 
society, and himself in a productive manner. A man should 
also be thrifty. These values would cause a distrust of the 
idle rich and merchants, the former because they did not 
produce or serve, and the latter because he was seen to 
overcharge for his services (Morgan 1968:236-237). As the 
nobility and the merchant class represented the power of 
England it is not surprising that the colonists developed a 
distrust of the mother country.
This value system was perhaps strongest in the 
Congregationalists of New England: however, Anglicans such 
as Henry Laurens and Richard Henry Lee demonstrate 
agreement, as do deists, Franklin and Jefferson (Morgan 
1968:239). The religious revival of the mid eighteenth 
century had a strong enough affect on Anglican Virginia to 
create a "party spirit" in the politics of the colony 
(Heimert 1978:437).
Frugality and avoidance of extravagance would have an 
effect on the material culture.* This would be amplified by 
the boycott movements preceding the Revolution. Boycotts, 
designed to repeal British tax laws, included artisans 
wearing leather work clothes, students refusing to drink 
beer, an avoidance of mutton to increase wool supplies, and 
in the case of the Stamp Act, a boycott of all British goods 
(Morgan 1968:240).
These non importation boycotts, in the opinion of some,
13
renewed ancestral values. It also spurred a movement toward 
self-sufficiency. Abigail Adams wrote that she would work 
with her hands. Although the movement toward industry fell 
short of providing the production necessary to supply the 
war effort, it did instill a belief that the colonists had 
the ability to provide their own manufactured goods. They 
were developing a sense of political and economic 
independence (Morgan 1968:241, 245, 251).
Frugality and avoidance of extravagance, based upon
religious/ethical beliefs, are characteristics of the
military material culture discussed in this study. The
economic condition of the United States, likewise, had an
affect on the form of this equipment. The question posed by
this study, that the equipment reflects the society's
attitude towards militarism and war, is not incompatible
with these cultural forces. The attitude of the eighteenth
century American toward war was a product of the same belief
system that preached frugality.
According to American ministers, war was a sin and a 
product of sin. God permitted it and guided it for 
the improvement of His people. In practice, this 
meant that Britons sinned in waging war, while 
Americans suffered the consequences of war because 
of their own sins... (Royster 1979:13).
If a system of religious/ethic beliefs dictated a 
purpose to war, would not the economy and frugality 
concerning material culture contained in that system be part 
that the war effort? If the war effort is successful it is 
because of God's guidance and justifies the cause. The
14
material culture of the Virginia soldier represents 
frugality, especially when compared to the extravangance 
found in the non functional decorative attributes of 
European equipment. The success of the American cause 
includes the equipment that made victory possible.
METHOD
As was stated in the second paragraph of this 
introduction, the purpose of this study is to test the 
hypothesis that the equipment of a soldier reflects the 
attitude of his society to war. In order to proceed with 
this work it is necessary to accept the validity of related 
hypotheses. (1) Material culture reflects attitudes of the 
producer and user society. (2) The military material 
culture will reflect the attitude of a society toward the 
role of the military in that society. (3) As the role of 
the military is war, or the threat of war, for political 
purposes, a society which sees this activity in relatively 
positive terms is a militaristic society. A society which 
views this activity in relatively negative terms is a 
nonmilitaristic society. (4) The military material culture 
of a militaristic society will differ from a non 
militaristic society. Although these hypotheses will not be 
directly tested, related material will be presented in the 
course of this study.
This study is, in essence, a cross cultural comparison 
of North American and western European societies of the
15
second half of the eighteenth century looking at their 
attitudes toward war as reflected in the military material 
culture. The American Revolution was a major conflict for 
these societies. The equipment used by the American and 
British soldier to fight this war will be the focus of this 
study.
It is necessary to further narrow the parameters, for 
manageability, while providing a sufficient amount of data 
to establish some degree of confidence in the analysis and 
interpretation. It would be difficult to deal with the 
total military equipment of the American Revolution. 
Therefore, this study is limited to the equipment used by 
the Virginians who served with the infantry of the 
Continental Army. The reasons for this choice are:
1. The Continental Army was made up of units 
(regiments/battalions) provided by the individual states.
The state was responsible (it did not always meet this 
responsibility) for the equipment used by its soldiers.
This made each state's troops somewhat unique. Although any 
state's troops would have served the purpose of this study, 
the Virginia troops are used as Virginia was a leader in the 
Revolution and the attitudes of this regional society 
contributed to the beginnings of a national character during 
and after the War.
2. Infantry equipment was chosen as infantry made up 
the bulk of the Army and represented the population as a 
whole. The other branches, cavalry and artillery, were, by
16
comparison, specialized units, constituting numerically a 
small proportion of the total army. The material culture 
associated with these soldiers might not be representative 
due to the specific and limited function of these units. 
Also, these units, considered prestigious in the military of 
the period, tended to be led by individuals from the upper 
socioeconomic classes.
3. Although Virginia organized and supported militia 
and regular units for service within the State, the units 
with the Continental Army had the opportunity to mix with 
units from other states. This opportunity was unusual in a 
country where geographic isolation was common. The 
Virginians of the Continental Army were part of a shared 
experience with men from other regions.
There are many surviving pieces of military equipment 
from the American Revolution. Unfortunately, most of this 
equipment has no documentation concerning where it was used 
or by whom it was used. This problem dictated the first 
step of a three step process for this study. It was 
necessary to discover what equipment was used by the 
Virginians which would then allow a representative example 
of existing equipment to serve as an illustration.
This required that primary, and selected secondary, 
documentary materials be reviewed to construct a list of 
equipment. This list was then used in conjunction with 
works that illustrated eighteenth century artifacts to match 
descriptions with examples. These examples could then be
17
compared to ascertain patterns in the various attributes.
The resulting evidence can be interpreted and conclusions 
drawn.
The documentary evidence of equipment used by the 
Virginia soldier is not overwhelming in amount or detail. 
What is available provides a general impression of the 
clothing, arms, and other items. The quality and quantity 
of this evidence varies through the eight years of the war. 
The periods of late 1775-early 1776 and late 1778-early 1779 
are comparatively rich in records. The interim period is 
sketchy, at best. The final years of the war, 1780-1783, 
has little substantive information.
The equipment issued by the state to the soldiers early 
in the war is documented in the records of the Williamsburg 
Public Store. These records were transcribed and annotated 
in "Clothing and Accoutrements of the Officers and Soldiers 
of the Virginia Forces 1775-1780", by Mary Goodwin in 1962 
(unpublished manuscript). These records, although they 
cover nearly six years of the war, are of most value in 
understanding the initial supply of the soldiers mustering 
at Williamsburg in the autumn 1775-spring 1777. The later 
years provide little information concerning supply to 
specific units.
What is noted in the later years of the Williamsburg 
records is the shipping of equipment north, much of it 
probably destined for distribution in Philadelphia.
"Records of the Public Store, Philadelphia", detail the
18
distribution of equipment to the Virginia regiments during 
the autumn, winter, and spring of 1778-1779. The large 
amount and variety of items issued in this period not only 
provides an impression of the appearance of the Virginia 
regiments as a result of this supply, but also speaks 
indirectly to the need of these troops prior to the issue.
The period between the initial equipment issue in 
Williamsburg and the substantial resupply in Philadelphia is 
covered by deserter description that appear as 
advertisements in two newspapers, the Virginia Gazette and 
Pennsylvania Packet. These provide a very small sample and 
are therefore of limited value in understanding the 
equipment of the Virginia regiments during this period.
These descriptions suggest variety rather than uniformity in 
the Virginia line. Although the descriptions are of value, 
their weight in providing a balanced picture of the 
soldier's equipment must be limited.
Another primary source available to this study are the 
collected writings of military and civilian leaders such as 
George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, George Weeden, Robert 
Gamble, and Nathaniel Greene. These sources contain 
correspondence and army orders which refer to equipment 
need, equipment supply, and quality. That equipment was 
supplied is often inferred from the lack of further 
requests. These sources were essential in determining the 
type of musket that was used by the Virginia soldier.
The second part of this study uses sources which
19
illustrate the military material culture of the American 
Revolution. These works, many of which were stimulated by 
the bicentennial of the war, are used by the collector of 
military equipment to identify and authenticate items. 
Artifacts are usually grouped into categories such as 
weapons, clothing, camp equipment, etc. These may be 
subdivided by ethnicity or in which branch of the army they 
might be found; infantry, artillery, cavalry, medical 
service, etc.
These sources rarely provide information concerning the 
history of a specific piece of equipment. Nor do they 
provide a sample that is detailed or sufficiently large to 
accommodate a quantitative study. However, these sources do 
provide a sufficient amount of examples for the purpose of 
this study.
Another source of information, or perhaps bias, that 
must be noted is the author's use of accurate reproductions 
of the equipment in this study. A decade and a half of 
participation in living history programs using these 
reproduced artifacts has perhaps provided unique insights 
concerning these items. An attempt has been made not to 
include specific ideas and thoughts gained from this 
experience, as this activity has been approached as a hobby 
rather than experimental archeology, although the 
possibility of research is present and questions have been 
pursued. Consequently, there is a possibility that this 
study has been influenced by these experiences.
20
The third, and final step, is comparing and contrasting 
attributes of selected artifacts in regard to the five 
assumptions stated above. There are easily recognizable 
differences between the individual pieces of equipment used 
by the Virginian and his opponent. Yet, do these 
differences present a pattern in the entire assemblage of 
military material culture? Does this pattern relate to 
differences in the respective societies?
This study is limited to suggesting that the material 
culture presented reflects differences in the societies that 
produced and/or used the items.
Obviously, the societal attitude represented by the 
material culture is also affected by diverse cultural and 
environmental forces. Economics and politics impacted 
heavily on the military equipment used by the Virginians. 
However, a pattern does develop. This pattern may well have 
continued after the war and thereby suggests an attitude not 
exclusive to Virginia but shared by the new American nation.
THE MILITARY IN ENGLAND AND NORTH AMERICA
This study is concerned with differences in the 
military material culture of the opponents in the American 
Revolution. These differences, of course, did not result in 
isolation from the forces that cause cultural change in 
society. Although a large portion of the colonial 
population of North America, south of Canada, was English, 
or of English ancestry, the military system that evolved in 
the colonies differed greatly from that of the home country. 
An overview of the respective systems, and the confrontation 
between those systems, would be of value before examination 
of the equipment produced for and by these systems.
The differences between the the British and North 
American military systems can be examined through their 
development during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
The British system was well developed by the beginning of 
this period. Change in the British military faced the 
challenge of tradition and special interests, economic and 
political, which profited by maintaining the status quo.
The system present in North America faced a far different 
environment, socio cultural and natural. This difference 
included actual and potential foes, the distance from the 
support system of the mother county, and the natural 




The military system of England developed from the 
feudal system which focused on a warrior class. Successful 
individuals in this class were rewarded with land holdings. 
The land included responsibility for political 
administration. Consequently, a close relationship between 
the military and government developed. As England developed 
an ever increasing role in regional and global trade and the 
protection of that trade, the need for maintaining a 
standing army was realized. Prior to this the warrior 
raised a force to serve as needed by the King or the noble 
he served.
The maintenance of a standing army required centralized 
control. Yet, the monarch in many cases did not maintain 
control of the army. He contracted much of the need to 
private business. These businessmen, who had gained power 
through trade, shunned actual service preferring to buy it 
as they did other necessary labor. (Vagt 1959:46).
Leadership was provide by the descendants of the warrior 
class. These nobles, or gentry, maintained great power 
within the military and substantial influence in the 
government.
In the decades preceding the American Revolution the 
dual role of soldier/politician was not uncommon. The 
English Parliaments of 1732-1733 and 1754 had 54 members who 
were army officers. The parliament of 1761 had 64 officers 
including John Burgoyne, William Howe, and Charles 
Cornwallis (Vagt 1959:66). These three men were major
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figures in the American Revolution.
Perhaps the militaristic society of eighteenth century 
England did not compare with that of Prussia. "In England 
the first people of state held the military positions, and 
not, as Frederick demanded in Prussia, the reverse - the 
military taking the uppermost state positions" (Vagt 
1959:66). However, by comparison to the system developed in 
the North American colonies it was indeed militaristic. 
"Europe, almost to the end of the ancien regime, remained a 
society in which the ruling class was also a military class. 
The sword, accoutrement de riguer of anyone pretending to 
the title of gentleman, was the outward symbol of that 
identification" (Keegan 1987:4).
In England, and Europe in general, the gentry provided 
the leaders of a professional, standing army (England 
maintained a militia system for home defense but it was 
seldom embodied). This system was to begin to break down 
with the French Revolution in 1789. The seeds of this 
change were, however, in existence before this time. The 
vanguard of change came in the form of writers of the 
Enlightenment. They were highly critical of militarism and 
standing armies (Vagt 1959:75-78). In the British North 
American colonies much of this "enlightenment" was already 
in practice.
Until the final French and Indian War in the 1750's 
England provided very little military support to the North 
American colonies. The colonists were on their own to deal
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with whatever force the French, Dutch, Spanish, or Native 
Americans might use. "As the charter of Massachusetts Bay 
made clear, the inhabitants alone were 'to incounter, 
expulse, repell and resist by force or armes, as well by sea 
as by lands' any attempt to invade or destroy their 
community" (Higginbotham 1971:1).
The need for an organized system for protection 
produced local military units. This was in keeping with the 
local organization and control of other institutions such as 
the county court, the town meeting, and the church 
congregation. The militia, under local leadership, was 
meant to meet local need (Higginbotham 1971:7).
The local nature of the militia did not prevent 
operations that could justifiable be called a campaign.
From 169 0 through 174 6 the colonists mounted major 
expeditions against the French. Though most were 
unsuccessful, the 1745 attack on the French stronghold of 
Louisbourg on Cape Breton Island was a victory. The fort 
was returned by England to France by treaty only to be 
recaptured a decade later (Higginbotham 1971:9-10). 
Obviously, this action was not popular with the colonists.
It is important to note that the militia managed to 
accomplish what was expected and therefore the system was 
retained. This system had three features that set it apart 
from the English militaristic system. It was embodied only 
as needed, for training or an emergency. Its members 
included the entire community. It was governed by local
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authority.
That these features made the colonial system different 
from the European is reinforced by the European 
"enlightenment". Voltaire call soldiers hired murderers. 
Rousseau said that armies were a pest. Enlightenment 
thinkers thought an army should embody the principles of 
nature, rights of man, and reason (Vagt 1959:75-77).
Rousseau thought every citizen shall be a soldier from 
duty, and be ready, but only when called upon (Vagt 
1959:77). It can be supposed that colonial leaders read 
these writings and saw that the militia system, already in 
place in North America, met the ideal. This would further 
reinforce the value of the system.
The English militaristic system and the North American 
military system met in conflict over a thirty year span 
1753-1783. This time can be divided into three distinct 
periods. 1753-1761 was a period in which the two systems 
cooperated against a common foe, France. 1761-1775 the 
English system confronted the colonies by the maintenance of 
garrisons in North America. The final period 1775-1783 was 
the American Revolution. Here the two systems were in 
confrontation.
The first period includes the French and Indian War. 
British regulars and colonial troops, in essence embodied 
militia, served side by side. Although, many of the 
colonials served in a logistical position or as reserve 
troops, they were witness to the vulnerability of
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professional soldier (Higginbotham 1971:22). They saw 
overwhelming defeats of the British at Fort William Henry in 
1757 and at Ticonderoga in 1758. They compared this to the 
provincials victory under Sir William Johnson in 1756. This 
undoubtedly brought the relative quality of the systems into 
question.
Also, the adaptability of colonists to the 
environmental conditions should be examined. Beginning with 
a rearguard action by colonial troops at Braddock's defeat, 
through the Saint Francis expedition by Rogers' Rangers in 
1759, colonials adjusted tactics and equipment to meet the 
challenge of the enemy. That the British army would adopt 
modifications in their organization and equipment (example, 
use of rifles and formation of a light infantry regiment, 
the 80th) based on the colonial example must have suggested 
to the colonists the relative value of the two systems. 
Hamilton 1962:217. Knox 1980:159)
The second period highlights the incompatibility of the 
two systems. The British militaristic system, represented 
by the British soldier, remained on North American soil.
The colonists, left on their own for more than a century, 
found it unacceptable to have these troops remain, 
especially after the main threat, the French, had been 
removed. Added to the presence of the troops, a standing 
army, were unpopular demands,laws, and taxes, in some cases 
enforced by the British soldier (Higginbotham 1971:29-31).
The capture of many frontier forts during Pontiac's
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uprising in 17 63 again gave question to the value of the 
British military presence. At the end of the period the 
defeat of the Shawnee at the battle of Point Pleasant by 
colonial troops reinforced the belief that the colonists 
could fend for themselves.
The third period, the American Revolution, was not 
meant to be a test of these systems yet the outcome might 
well have been used by the French revolutionists and others 
to suggest the "righteousness1 of the cause, or perhaps a 
more important point, it could succeed.
What part the two systems played in the outcome of the 
American Revolution is part of the complexity of of the 
event. It must be balanced against various economic, 
political, social, geographical, and environmental factors. 
The North American military system had been tested for a 
century and a half on the ground of, and prior to, the 
American Revolution. The British system could make some 
adaptations but was unable to adjust as was necessary to 
win.
The result of the American victory would be to further 
solidify the belief in the system. Washington, who had 
advocated a regular army during the war, now referred to the 
militia as a bulwark of liberty and independence. He called 
for a system in every state that would include almost all 
men. They would be trained an organized under a common 
plan. From this national militia a ready reserve would be 
formed from men ages eighteen to twenty five. They would be
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trained twenty five days each year in their own companies 
but also in battalion and brigade formation (Higginbotham 
1971:442). This system would have pleased those who feared 
the standing army and the militaristic system it 
represented.
Much of the British system was maintained into the 
early twentieth century when the complexities of warfare due 
to technological change and larger armies forced a change. 
Although conscription was avoided until World War I, the 
army was reorganized in the years before the war. For the 
first time a general staff was formed similar to that found 
in the Prussian tradition. A military intelligence 
organization was established. The old militia system was 
discarded in favor of the Territorial Army. Officer 
training programs were founded in public schools. The war 
itself was to be responsible for finally "obliterating the 
traditional distinction between soldier and civilian" 
(Arnstein 1976:229-230, 244).
The North American colonists, although of British 
stock, were not of the group that provided the leaders of 
the British military. The lack of this ingredient in the 
traditions which were imported from the home country allowed 
them to adopt a military system which proved better suited 
to the environment of North America. This system was 
distinct from the British military system in that it was 
universal, involving the total population, was under 
civilian control, and was only embodied as necessary. This
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distinction is illustrated in the equipment used by the 
opposing forces in the American Revolution.
PART I
EQUIPMENT OF THE VIRGINIA CONTINENTAL LINE
CLOTHING
Clothing and equipping the soldiers of the Virginia 
Line may have well been more difficult than finding the men 
to fill the 15 regiments demanded by the Continental 
Congress. Virginia did, however, send 15 regiments to the 
Continental line, plus two regiments of the Virginia State 
Line. It would appear that every effort was made to supply 
these men with the equipment needed to do the job.
Clothing, as with other kinds of equipment, did not 
consistantly meet the ideal of an eighteenth century army.
The Virginians marched to join Washington as soon as the
regiment was of sufficient strength and equipment to leave. 
Therefore, an individuals equipment would be dependent on 
what was available when he received his "issue". If blue 
breeches were available he received blue. The next man, 
perhaps from the same company, might be the first to get a
issue out of the next bale and these breeches might be
green.
As time went on the soldier's clothing would wear out 
and he might be issued new britches made out of linen or 
buckskin. If he had money he might buy his own from a
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civilian tailor. His clothing may have worn out at a 
different rate than that of other men in his company. If 
they were all uniform at one point in time, six months later 
there would be variety in the uniforms.
Soldiers would sell excess clothing if they had it or 
use it in gambling. Clothing was taken from the dead, sick, 
and discharged soldier. This would be reissued. If 
anything was uniform about a Virginian's clothing it might 
well be a lack of uniformity.
The documentation of the clothing worn by Virginia 
troops comes from three sources. Deserter descriptions were 
published in newspapers. The descriptions give the clothing 
of the deserter, his regiment, and the date. This gives, of 
course, a very small sample to justify proposing that this 
represented the "look" of a particular regiment. The 
factors that led to diversity in uniforms, as stated above, 
suggest that deserter descriptions have limitations as 
resources and may or may not be accurate in describing the 
appearance of the soldier's comrades.
State records provide a list of items issued but lack 
detailed descriptions. The numbers of breeches, shirts, and 
hats are given with occasional reference to type of material 
and/or color. These records include yard goods issued to 
individual regiments and companies. This material was made 
into garments by soldiers with skill as tailors and by 
civilian tailors. This probably caused diversity due to the 
skill of the individual workman.
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The third source of documentation are references 
gleaned from orders, letters, and elsewhere that mention 
clothing needs. There are references to the men being naked 
or ragtag. These references often lack a point of 
comparison. A man in the eighteenth century without a coat 
was considered undressed. These descriptions will be used 
with others to attempt to build a picture of the Virginia 
soldier.
In this chapter each of the 15 Virginia Line Regiments 
and the 1st and 2nd State Line Regiments will be examined in 
light of the documentation concerning their uniforms. Also 
the Light Infantry Brigade of 1779 will be included as 
Virginians were a part of this special detachment.
1st VIRGINIA REGIMENT [Old 1st, and 9th]
The 1st Virginia Regiment was initially supplied by
companies drawing equipment from the Williamsburg Public 
Store from October 177 5-February 1776. Companies commanded 
by John Green, William Davies, John Seayres, John Markham, 
Robert Ballard, John Fleming, William Campbell, and George 
Gibson received supplies (Goodwin 1962:20-32, 44-45, 50, 
52-61, 63, 65, 68). These nine companies would account for 
most, if not all, the personnel of the regiment.
The need for shoes was common with all companies except
Gibson's. All companies, except Campbell's received blue
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wool suitable for leggings. They received buttons which 
indicates they were making their own clothes and/or issued 
clothing came without buttons. Six of the eight companies 
received hats and material for hunting shirts. Five 
companies received shirts or the material to make shirts. 
Three companies received checked shirts. Three were issued 
stockings.
Markham and Seayres company's received green flannel. 
Markham got 87 yards and Seayres 8 6 3/4 yards. They also 
got 7 3 yards and 82 1/2 yards of oznaburg for breeches 
lining which suggests the end use for the green flannel 
(Goodwin 1962:30-31). Ballard's and Davies' Companies 
received red duffle for "Capes and c.[such] for hunting 
shirts" (Goodwin 1962:32). There was some blue cloth and 
coating issued with no specifics as to end use.
The Williamsburg Public Store records indicate that the 
soldiers of the 1st Virginia appeared uniform in clothing as 
they marched North in 1776. They wore hunting shirts 
probably of the same style and color, usually brown or other 
dark color. They had blue wool leggings. Three companies, 
at least, had checked shirts. Their hats were probably the 
short brimmed round hat popular with light troops, although 
it is possible they wore a full military cocked hat. They 
wore the knee length breeches of the 18th Century with 
coarse woolen stockings and the common shoe. Probably the 
men wore a waistcoat, wool or linen, the color(s) 
undetermined.
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The reference to red duffle for capes and c. would 
provide evidence that the hunting shirt trim was of this 
material. Usually the collar and cuffs contrasted with the 
body of the garment. The term cape may mean a simple collar 
or a piece of material that spread over the shoulders as an 
added protection from the weather. This was a normal 
feature of some hunting shirts although it was usually of 
linen. It would be unusual to use wool for a cape over 
linen but it would be very functional. The wool would 
provide warmth and better protection against rain than 
linen. The body of the hunting shirt, made of linen, would 
allow air circulation and the evaporation of perspiration.
This uniform did not compare with the standard European 
military fashion but it was a relatively inexpensive and a 
very functional alternative. The upper body was protected 
by a heavy linen hunting shirt with an extra layer of 
material over the shoulders. A waistcoat underneath added 
warmth. The hunting shirt extended to mid thigh where it 
met the top of thick wool leggings. These protected the 
legs, breeches, and stockings from the damage caused by 
plants and grasses when off the road, as well as, 
undergrowth in the woods. They also provide warmth and, by 
extending over the shoe tops, kept stones and such from 
getting into the shoes. The colors of these garments, blue, 
green, and brown provided a camouflage in the extensive 
forests of North America.
After the initial outfitting of the 1st Virginia, and
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this is the case with the regiments that follow, the 
Williamsburg Public Store records are of limited use. Only 
one entry for the regiment appears in 1777. Captain John 
Green received 16 hunting shirts and 7 3 pair of leggings on 
April 12 (Goodwin 1962:120). The appearance of this 
regiment in later service with the Continental Army is found 
in deserter descriptions.
The Virginia Gazette, October 24, 1777, described a 
deserter from Lt. Francis Mennis1 Company of the 1st 
Virginia as wearing a blue coat, white waistcoat and 
breeches, and white hat (Lefferts 1971:141). This is 
similar to an earlier advertisement in the Gazette on 
January 17, 1777 for a deserter from Captain Nelson's 
Company. This man had a blue regimental coat, faced red 
(collar, cuffs, lapels), white small clothes (waistcoat, 
breeches), and a white hat. This clothing shows a change 
from the frontier costume, described above, to a look more 
in keeping with that of a European soldier.
This uniform may not have been available to all as 
suggested by the issue of hunting shirts and leggings to 
Capt. Green mentioned above. The Virginia Gazette ran an 
advertisement on May 23, 1777 for a deserter wearing a
yellow hunting shirt. The color seems unusual in comparison 
to the dark colors usually chosen. This could be as a 
result of environmental effects on the garment dye. The 
author of this study has had linen reproduction clothing, 
dyed brown, fade to a pinkish-brown hue. Another
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explanation might be that with field experience this 
regiment chose a bright color feeling confident to meet the 
enemy in the open field and the concealment a dark color 
provided in the forest was no longer a concern.
In the autumn of 177 8 recruits for the 1st Virginia 
were issued a suit of regimental cloths, a hat, 2 shirts, 2 
pairs of stockings and 2 pairs of shoes (Goodwin 1962:146). 
This was in compliance with a law for raising volunteers 
passed earlier that year. The suit of regimentals consisted 
of a coat, jacket, and breeches. The term jacket is not 
easily defined. This may be a waistcoat with sleeves, a 
garment used by British light troops and popular with both 
sides in the French and Indian War.
The troops already in the field were not neglected.
The Schooner May Flower was sent North at the end of October 
1778 with a cargo containing 369 suits, 32 coats, 7 jackets, 
and various pieces of cloth (Goodwin 1962:146-147). It 
seems possible that this was not the only shipment as it 
would have been insufficient for the entire Virginia Line.
These supplies may have gone directly to the army or 
may have been delivered to the Virginia Public Store in 
Philadelphia. In late 1778 and early 1779 the Public Store 
issued a tremendous amount of clothing and miscellaneous 
equipment to the individual regiments of the Virginia line. 
In September of 1778 the Line had been consolidated into 11 
regiments and the 1st and 2nd Virginia State Line were 
serving with the Continental Army (Sellers 1978:49).
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The records show the 1st Virginia received in September 
and October, 1778, 456 pairs of shoes, 642 pairs of 
stockings, 238 soldier's shirts, 47 stocks, and 17 coats 
(PPS 1778-1779:9-11). The monthly strength report of this 
unit in October of 1778 show the regiment had 279 officers 
and men on duty out of a total of 491 on the roster (Lesser 
1976:88). The amount of eqipment issued compared to the 
number of men on duty indicates that the men of this 
regiment were in need of supplies. Similar amounts of 
supplies are issued to all the regiments at this time. The 
1st Virginia and the entire Virginia Line, probably "rag 
tag" in appearance in the summer of 1778, became well 
uniformed by the spring of 1779.
The issue of specific items of clothing is only part of 
the supplies received. The 1st Virginia also got scarlet, 
buff, and black cloth, thread, woolen caps, flannel 
waistcoats, cloth waistcoats, cloth breeches, stock buckles, 
coat buttons, vest buttons, and linen yard goods (PPS 
1778-1779:9-11). It is obvious that the Army was producing 
its own clothing as well as receiving contracted uniforms.
It is also possible that the 1st Virginia and the other 
regiments that received equipment at this time were isssued 
clothing produced in France. The French coat was blue faced 
red, waistcoats red or blue, and breeches red or green 
(Mollo 1975:193-194).
There is no specific documentation as to the 1st 
Virginia receiving clothing between the spring of 1779 and
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May of 1780 when they surrendered with the garrison of 
Charleston, South Carolina. They left the main army with 
the other Virginia regiments in the autumn of 177 9 and 
marched to Virginia where the Line was reorganized into 
three detachments and were to receive supplies before 
marching for Charleston. The supply problems slowed the 1st 
Virginia Detachment's (the old 1st Virginia was part of this 
unit) move south. They, and the 2nd Virginia Detachment, did 
not reach Charleston until April 1780 (Sellers 1978:62-63). 
The 3rd Virginia Detachment due to supply problems was not 
ready to take the field until after Charleston had fallen 
(Sellers 1978:68).
The 1st Virginia served as long as any unit of the 
Virginia military in the Revolution. There is no evidence 
to suggest that they were any better, or worse, supplied 
than any other unit. Similarities in supply of other units 
with that of the 1st Virginia will allow reference to the 
description of this unit's clothing in type and source.
This will avoid needless repetition.
2nd VIRGINIA REGIMENT [Old 2nd and 6th]
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The records of the Williamsburg Public Store list 
equipment issued to the 2nd Virginia Regiment during the 
same period the 1st Virginia received supplies, late 1775 
through early 177 6. Six companies are mentioned in these 
lists, commanded by Captains George Johnson, Richard Parker, 
William Taliferro, Richard Meade, Samuel Haws, and William 
Fountain (Gooodwin 1962:21, 27, 30, 32-34, 42-44, 46-50, 69,
75, 83). As this unit received equipment from the same 
store and at the same time as the 1st Virginia, it is not 
surprising that the material is similar as would be the 
appearance of the Regiment.
Five of the six companies received oznaburg for hunting 
shirts. The exception is William Fountain's Company which 
is noted as a rifle company (Goodwin 1962:47). The hunting 
shirt was a traditional item of clothing for the rifleman 
therefore it is possible that Fountain's command came to 
Williamsburg with this garment. Also, two early deserter 
descriptions in the Virginia Gazette of September 6, 1776 
and January 24, 1777, list brown hunting shirts (Lefferts 
1971:141). This sample, although small, suggests a uniform 
color for this Regiment.
Five companies received stockings, three specifically 
blue hose. Four companies received shoes and four hats.
All the companies were issued blue material suitable for 
leggings. Haw's Company got oznaburg for this purpose
40
rather than wool (Goodwin 1962:75).
The style of these leggings is questionable. Two 
different styles were familiar to the Americans. During and 
after the French and Indian War period military fashion 
included a high legging, or full gaiter, made of heavy 
linen, which extended from the shoe top to above the knee. 
This buttoned on the outside of the leg. A similar garment 
of leather or wool was worn by Native Americans which had
sewn or laced seam rather than buttons. William
Taliaferro's Company received horn buttons for leggings 
(Goodwin 1962:42). This indicates that the leggings were of 
the military variety.
Richard Meade's Company received 4 0 yards of oznaburg 
for breeches lining and 70 yards of flannel with no end use 
specified (Goodwin 1962:48). The flannel may have been for 
constructing breeches and the discrepancy between the 
yardage of flannel and oznaburg might be due to colonial
garments not being fully lined.
Documentation of the clothing of this regiment between 
the initial Williamsburg issues and the issues from the 
Philadelphia Store in late 1778-early 1779 is, as with the 
1st Virginia, limited to deserter descriptions. In January 
1777, the Virginia Gazette ran advertisements for deserters 
from the 2nd Virginia. One man had a blue coat, the other a 
brown coat. One had brown linen trousers, the other 
buckskin. One had a flapped hat, the other a macaroni hat 
with a black band and silver buckle (Lefferts 1971:141-142).
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This is a small sample but it suggests a lack of uniformity 
in contrast to the troops that marched North.
The Pennsylvania Packet on March 11, 1778 gives a
deserter description. The man has a blue coat with blue 
velvet collar, green waistcoat, buckskin breeches, and a 
round hat. The velvet collar is out of the ordinary, 
however, the blue coat does match the coats of three 
deserters mentioned in a deserter description on September 
5, 1777. These coats had white binding (Lefferts 1971:141).
The 2nd Virginia, like the 1st, may have benefited from 
the material shipped from Williamsburg in the autumn of 
1778. They received a substantial amount of equipment from 
the Philadelphia Store (PPS 1778-1779:11-12). Like the 
other units it probably was the last major supply received 
before the surrender at Charleston (Sellers 1978:62).
The material issued from the store at Philadelphia 
included large numbers of shoes, stockings, shirts, hats, 
and caps. Linen and other cloth, as well as, buttons and 
thread were issued (PPS 1778-1779:11-12). The new clothing 
would help make the winter more comfortable, however, the 
issue of neck stocks indicates a soldierly appearance would 
be required.
The 2nd Virginia's appearance did not greatly differ 
from the other regiments of the Virginia Line. The white 
binding on the coats, mentioned above, instead of coats 
"turned up" with a contrasting color was somewhat unique. 
Yet, for most of the war the 2nd Virginia probably suffered
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shortages and benefited from adequate supply with their 
fellow Virginians.
3rd VIRGINIA REGIMENT
Documentary evidence concerning the 3rd Virginia is 
limited. The Williamsburg records refer to only one company 
of this regiment, commanded by John Chilton. Chilton 
received oznaburg for hunting shirts and blue half-thick, a 
wool material suitable for leggings (Goodwin 1962:41). This 
issue was during the same period the 1st and 2nd Regiments 
received supplies and suggests the 3rd Virginia's appearance 
might be the same as these other units.
The Pennsylvania Packet of September 5, 1778 provides 
the only deserter description for this Regiment. Two men 
left wearing light blue drab coats with pale blue facings, 
green vests, and linen overalls (Lefferts 1971:142). The 
green vests, which also appear in the 2nd regiment, indicate 
uniformity. The overalls, like the hunting shirt, are a 
very functional piece of clothing combining breeches and 
leggings into one garment.
The 3rd Virginia received a large quanity of supplies 
from the Philadelphia Store in 1778-1779. They were issued 
shoes and shoe buckles, stockings, shirts, coats, wool and 
linen vests, wool caps, and stocks and buckles. They got 
linen and wool cloth, thread and buttons (PPS n.d.:13-14).
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The need to manufacture their own clothes, as others were 
doing, indicates the need of this regiment were those faced 
by the other units of the Virginia Line.
4th VIRGINIA REGIMENT [Old 4th and 8th]
The 4th Virginia is represented in the Williamsburg
Store record by a single company commanded by John Brent.
They received oznaburg for hunting shirts and blue coating 
which may have been for leggings (Goodwin 1962:71). This 
documentation is augmented by a early deserter description 
in the Virginia Gazette on September 27, 1776. This man is 
described as having a hunting shirt faced with red, checked 
shirt, and trousers (Lefferts 1971:142). The red facing 
refers to collar and cuffs and corresponds to the evidence 
cited in the disscussion of the 1st Virginia.
The Philadelphia Store records lists the 4th Virginia 
as receiving the same type of supplies as the other units, 
stockings, shoes, stocks, shirts, coats, wool caps, shoe 
buckles, flannel waistcoats, cloth breeches, and hats. The 




The 5th Virginia Regiment appears in the Williamsburg 
Store record as of March 4, 1776 when Captain George 
Stubblefield received oznaburg for hunting shirts and 
leggings (Goodwin 1962:70). Two other companies are 
recorded. John Pleasant received coating and frieze for 
leggings and Ralph Faulkner was issued blue hose (Goodwin 
1962:76,77). The 5th became part of the 3rd Virginia during 
the reorganization of the Virginia Line in September, 1778.
6th VIRGINIA REGIMENT
The 6th Virginia Regiment is better documented than other
regiments. An orderly book contains the following
regimental order dated April 3, 177 6.
The Captains of the 6th Battalion, together with the
other Officers, are immediately to provide
themselves with Hunting Shirts, short and fringed; 
the men's shirts are to be short and plain, the 
Sergeants' shirts to have small white cuffs and 
plain; The Drummers shirts to be with dark cuffs.
Both Officers and Soldiers to have Hats cut round 
and bound with black; The Brims of their Hat's to be
two inches deep and cocked on one, with a button and
loop and cockades, which is to be worn on the left. 
Neither men nor Officers to do duty in any other 
Uniform. The Officers and soldiers are to wear 
their hair short and as near a like as possible 
(Goodwin 1962:11).
The Williamsburg Public Store supplied five companies 
of the 6th Virginia from March 4, 1776, through September 
14, 1776. The companies were commanded by William Gregory, 
James Johnson, Thomas Massie, Samuel Cabell, and Oliver
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Towles (Goodwin 1962:70, 74-75, 77, 81-82, 89, 93-96). A 
deserter description in the Virginia Gazette, May 10, 1776, 
refers to a company commanded by Thomas Hutchings (Lefferts 
1971:142). Hutching's Company is not mentioned in the 
Williamsburg Public Store record.
The Williamsburg record and deserter descriptions do 
not necessarily support the uniformity called for in the 
regimental order quoted above. Gregory's and Johnsons 
Companies received oznaburg for hunting shirts, however, 
Towles received close bodied coats and jackets (Goodwin 
1962:74, 89, 96).
Deserter descriptions from the same period suggest a 
variety of clothing. The deserters from Hutching's Company 
had the following clothing:
hunting shirt dyed black 
blue duffle coat 
blue leggings
black and white mixed Virginia cloth coat and waistcoat 
copperas striped coat and waistcoat of Virginia cloth 
light colored kersey coat
leather breeches (Lefferts 1971:142-143).
Deserters from Samuel Cabell's Company were described 
in the Virginia Gazette, July 5, 1776, as having, 
new suit of gray broadcloth
hunting shirts trimmed in red [two examples] 
leather breeches
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breeches of light colored sagathy (Lefferts 1971:142)
Later in the year, October 18, 177 6, the Virginia 
Gazette described two deserters from the 6th Virginia: 
snuff colored coat and waistcoat 
silver button and loop to his hat 
dark colored hunting shirt
striped Virginia cloth coat and waistcoat 
russia drab breeches
The variety of clothing in these descriptions and that 
supplied from the Williamsburg Public Store does not support 
compliance with Order of April 3, 1776. The Public Store 
did issue shoes to four of the five companies and four of 
the five received leather breeches.
The leather breeches appear again in a deserter 
description in the Virginia Gazette, November 8, 1776. Two
of three men mentioned have leather breeches, all have 
hunting shirts trimmed red and one has a gray broadcloth 
waistcoat (Lefferts 1971:143). The waistcoat description is 
the same as the deserter from Cabell's Company mentioned 
above. The gray colored material appears once more in a 
deserter description in the Pennsylvania Packet, May 13, 
1778. This man had a light gray coat with green facings, a 
gray waistcoat, oznaburg overalls, and a small round hat 
with a piece of bear fur on it (Mollo 1975:176). The 6th 
Virginia was incorporated in to the 2nd Virginia during the
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reorganization of the Virginia Line in September, 1778.
7th VIRGINIA REGIMENT [old 11th]
The Williamsburg Public Store record provides much 
information concerning the clothing of the 7th Virginia, 
four companies were recorded as receiving supplies. These 
companies were commanded by Gregory Smith, Holt Richardson, 
Charles Tomkies, and Joseph Crockett (Goodwin 1962:73,
75-76, 80, 86, 89, 103). Another company, commanded by 
Nathanial Cocke, is mentioned in a deserter description in 
the Supplement to the Virginia Gazette of May 10, 1776.
Two of the four companies received oznaburg for hunting 
shirts. The deserter description mentions two men with dark 
colored hunting shirts and a third with a hunting shirt of 
Virginia striped cloth dyed almost black. This dark color 
appears in a later deserter description in the Virginia 
Gazette, April 4, 1776 (Lefferts 1971:143).
Other clothing items issued to the 7th Virginia in 
Williamsburg include hats, cloth for breeches, buttons, 
shoes, and coating for leggings. Tomkie's Company received 
twenty coats (Goodwin 1962:96). It is unclear if this meant 
a uniform coat. The deserter description of May 10 mentions 
a snuff colored coat (Lefferts 1971:143). This may be a 
similar garment.
The Regiment's commander, Colonel William Dangerfield,
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received a large amount of supplies from The Williamsburg 
store on May 13, 1776. It would not be unusual in the 
normal operation of the military in the eighteenth century 
for a regimental commander to be charged with equipment 
issued to his men. This is, however, unique to the 
Williamsburg record due to the large amount of supplies. 
Dangerfield received, 425 yards drilling 
504 yards check 
252 yards white linen 
159 1/2 yards stripes 
159 1/2 yards stripes 
174 yards white sheeting 
96 3/4 yards douls 
836 1/4 yards oznaburg 
80 felt hats 
248 pair shoes 
4 pieces cotton 82 yards 
24 dutch blankets best kind 
4 lb brown thread 
3 lb brown thread 
2 lb ditto
1 1/2 lb nuns thread 
8 yards duck (Goodwin 1962:86).
The 83 6 1/4 yards of oznaburg would produce 152 hunting 
shirts at 5 1/2 yards per shirt. This would be a sufficient 
supply for three companies using the desired number of 50
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men per company. If the material issued to the companies 
mentioned earlier is included this would have been 
sufficient to provide hunting shirts to the entire regiment.
A question is raised, however, due to the two issues of 
Virginia striped cloth to Dangerfield. The deserter 
description, mentioned earlier, describes a hunting shirt of 
Virginia striped cloth dyed almost black. If Virginia cloth 
was used for hunting shirts the oznaburg may well have been 
used for leggings. This was not uncommon. Since 
Dangerfield was not issued any heavy wool cloth, the heavier 
linen, oznaburg may have become leggings. The fact that two 
companies of the 7th received coating for leggings in an 
earlier issue would support the belief that heavy wool was 
not available.
The goods issued to the 7th Virginia suggests they were 
able to leave Williamsburg with a uniform appearance. Yet, 
by the spring of 1777 this uniformity was probably gone.
The Virginia Gazette printed two deserter description on 
April 4 that suggests a much different appearance for the 
regiment. One describes a man wearing a uniform coat of 
pale blue turned up with red calmanico. The other, which 
covers four deserters, lists dark colored hunting shirts, 
red waistcoat, light colored coarse cloth coat, and brown 
frieze leggings. This description specifies that one man's 
hunting shirt is fringed around the capes, ruffles, tail, 
and down the breast (Lefferts 1971:143). This is much more 
elaborate than the plain garment called for in the
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Regimental Order of the 6th Virginia. This also strongly 
suggests, due to the fringe running down the breast, that 
this hunting shirt was of the variety that was open in the
front rather than a pull over. In the Philadelphia issue of
1778-1779 the 7th, now renumbered the 5th Virginia, like its 
fellow units, received shirts, wool caps, cloth breeches, 
red waistcoats, waistcoats [no color specified], breeches, 
flannel waistcoats, stockings, stocks and buckles, hats, and 
shoe buckles. This is the only regiment that did not 
receive shoes. They also received linen, cloth, thread, and 
buttons (PPS 1778-1779:15-16).
8th VIRGINIA REGIMENT
General Charles Lee stated on August 2, 1776 that the
8th Virginia was the best armed, clothed, and equipped for 
immediate service (Sanchez-Saavedra 1978:56). A deserter 
description of this period describes the man as wearing a 
hunting shirt, breeches and flapped hat (Lefferts 1971:143). 
Lee was a former British army officer. He was familiar with 
the standard appearance of a European army. His statement, 
with the deserter description specifying the "regular" 
American uniform, indicates that, in his opinion, the 
equipment was the best that could be provided by the 
authorities in Virginia.
Only one issue to the 8th Virginia appears in the
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Williamsburg Public Store record. The regiment's commander, 
John Peter Gabriel Muhlenburg, received the following 
supplies on May 11, 177 6:
432 yards drilling
79 yards Ravs. duck
504 yards check
240 yards white linen
316 yards blue stripe
174 yards white sheeting
3 6 yards brown sheeting
8 0 yards douls
872 1/2 yards oznaburg
19 small blankets (Goodwin 1962:85)
The oznaburg probably was intended for hunting shirts. 
The check probably was for shirts. The other material it 
can be assumed was made up into breeches, waistcoats, and 
perhaps leggings.
Any uniformity suggested by the Williamsburg issues or 
Lee's statement seems to have been gone by 1777. Seperate 
deserter advertisements appeared in the Pennsylvania Packet 
for men from the same company. One advertisement, May 6, 
1777, described the man as having a hunting shirt, blue 
waistcoat, blue germantown milled stockings, and a macaroni 
beaver hat. The other advertisement, August 19, 1777, lists
the clothing as a short blue coat, linen jacket, breeches, 
and thread stockings (Lefferts 1971:143). The 8th Virginia
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was incorporated into the 4th Virginia in the reorganization 
of the Virginia Line in September 1778
9th VIRGINIA REGIMENT
The 9th Virginia Regiment is represented in the 
Williamsburg Public Store record by two companies commanded 
by James Innis and Samuel Woodson (Goodwin 1962:71-72, 
79-80). On March 29, 1776, Woodson was issued 370 yards of 
Oznaburg for hunting and body shirts. The use of the heavy 
oznaburg for body shirts suggests that lighter weight linen 
was unavailable. Shortages might also be indicated by 
Woodson receiving frieze and coating for leggings. The 
coarse frieze was a usual legging material but the coating 
was of lighter weight and greater cost and would not 
normally be used for this purpose.
Woodson also received hats, shoes and socks. Innis was 
issued a variety of material including broad cloth, frieze, 
douls. and coating. He also got shoes and hose.
The 9th Virginia served as part of the garrison at Fort 
Pitt. Garrison duty may have caused less wear on uniforms 
but the frontier location may have caused irregular supply. 
The only deserter description appeared in the Pennsylvania 
Packet, April 15, 1777. The deserter, from Captain Levin
Joynes Company, was wearing a light brown coat with red 
facings (Lefferts 1971:144). The 9th Virginia became part 
of the 1st Virginia in the reorganization of the Virginia
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Line in September, 1778.
10th VIRGINIA REGIMENT
The 10th Virginia Regiment does not appear in the 
Williamsburg Public Store records. There is only one 
deserter description. This description from 1777 lists the 
man, from Captain Thomas West's Company, as wearing a 
hunting shirt, drawers, and leggings (Lefferts 1971:144).
The 10th Virginia, renumbered the 6th Virginia, was in 
as much need as the other regiments in the autumn of 1778. 
Between September 2 5 and February 2, the 6th received 
shirts, stockings, shoes, woolen caps, soldiers hats, stocks 
and stock buckles. They also received linen, wool cloth, 
thread, and buttons (PPS 1778-1779:16-17).
11th VIRGINIA REGIMENT
The commander of the 11th Virginia Regiment was Daniel 
Morgan. Morgan was best known for his association with the 
use of riflemen throughout the war. It has been assumed 
that Morgan's regiment contained many riflemen probably 
wearing the traditional dress of riflemen including the 
hunting shirt (Higginbotham 1961:56-57). A deserter 
description for the 11th does little to confirm or refute
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this assumption. Two men left James Calderwood's Company 
wearing long, light colored, coats and jackets (Lefferts 
1971:144). These may be hunting shirts as these garments 
have been illustrated as being knee length.
The Philadelphia Public Store records show that the 
11th Virginia, now renumbered as the 7th Virginia, did not 
receive supplies until January 7, 1779, which is later than 
other regiments of the Virginia Line. The supplies the 
regiment received does not suggest that they were any less 
in need. They received brown linen, cloth, thread, and 
buttons. In clothing they received red cloth waistcoats, 
cloth breeches, woolen caps, stocks and buckles, shoes, and 
shirts (PPS 1778-1779:18).
The issues to this regiment were recorded in January 
and February, 1779, and are of lesser quantities than other 
units. This is probably due to the regiment mustering less 
than 60 officers and men fit for duty during those months, 
most of the regiment on furlough (Lesser 1976:100, 104).
12th VIRGINIA REIMENT
The 12th Virginia is not mentioned in the Williamsburg 
records. Documentation of this regiment's uniform before 
the issue in Philadelphia comes from deserter descriptions. 
Captain William Vause lost five men. The descriptions in 
the Pennsylvania Packet, August 13 and 19, 1777, lists three
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of the men wearing hunting shirts and leather breeches. One 
man wore a hunting shirt and trousers or overalls, and the 
last man, hunting shirt, trousers and a small round hat.
The Pennsylvania Packet of August 19 also lists a deserter 
from Michael Bowyer's Company wearing a coarse linen frock 
and overalls (Lefferts 1971:144). This coarse linen frock 
may be a hunting shirt the difference due to terminology 
used by the company commander or an army clerk.
The 12th Virginia, renumbered the 8th Virginia in the 
reorganization of September 1778, received a large amount of 
equipment from the Philadelphia Public Store in late 1778- 
early 1779. They were issued flannel and cloth waistcoats, 
cloth breeches, shoes, stockings, shirts, woolen caps, 
coats, stocks, and hats. As with the other regiments the 
8th received wool and linen material, thread, and buttons 
(PPS 1778-1779:19-20).
13th VIRGINIA REGIMENT
The 13th Virginia does not appear in the Williamsburg 
Public Store record. Deserter descriptions do, however, 
provide a small sample that suggests uniformity in this 
unit. The companies of James Neal and Davis Steele placed 
advertisements in the Pennsylvania Packets on April 22 and 
July 15, 1777, and in the Pennsylvania Evening Post on
August 16, 1777. Each description includes a blue
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regimental coat cuffed or faced with yellow (Lefferts 
1971:144). The reason one description specifies cuff color 
and another facing may be due to the individual who wrote 
the advertisement or perhaps slight variation in uniform 
coats. The 13th Virginia was sent to garrison Fort Pitt in 
May 1778 (Lesser 1971:70). The regiment was redesignated 
the 9th Virginia in the reorganization of September 1778.
The 9th Virginia is not listed in the Philadelphia Store 
record.
14th VIRGINIA REGIMENT
The only record of the 14th Virginia directly receiving 
supply from Williamsburg is 300 pair of hose on April 9,
1777 (Goodwin 1962:119). A deserter description in the 
Virginia Gazette, July 4, 1771, suggests that the need, at 
least to approach uniformity, might have been greater than 
stockings. Nathan Reid's Company lost two men, one wearing 
a striped cotton fly coat and waistcoat, linen drawers, and 
leggings. The other man had a white hunting shirt, leather 
leggings and moccasins (Lefferts 1971:144).
The 14th Virginia, renumbered the 10th Virginia in the 
reorganization of September 1778, received considerable 
supply from the Philadelphia Public Store between September
1778 and February 1779. They were issued shoes, stockings, 
shirts, woolen caps, breeches, waistcoats, hats, stocks, and
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stock buckles. They also received cloth, linen, thread, and 
buttons (PPS 1778-1779:20-21).
15th VIRGINIA REGIMENT
The 15th Virginia regiment appears in the Williamsburg 
store record with an issue to 1 soldier on November 24,
1778. He received a regimental suit, 10 1/2 yards of check, 
two pairs of hose, two pairs of shoes, and a hat (Goodwin 
1962:150). The yardage of check would be sufficient for two 
shirts. This issue was made at the same time this regiment 
was receiving supplies in Philadelphia. It is likely that 
the men with the Army received similar supplies.
The Philadelphia Store issued to the 15th Virginia, now 
the 11th Virginia, the same equipment issued to the other 
units. They received cloth breeches, flannel and cloth 
waistcoats, stockings, woolen caps, stocks and buckles, 
shirts, and hats. As was true of the other units, they 
received cloth, linen, thread and buttons (PPS 
1778-1779:22) .
1st VIRGINIA STATE LINE REGIMENT
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The 1st Virginia State Line Regiment appears in the 
Williamsburg Public Store record beginning March 15, 1777. 
Five companies and the regiment, through the commander, 
received supplies. The supplies included hose, shoes, 
checked shirts, and hats. In addition to this clothing they 
got oznaburg, sheeting, shalloon (a light wool used for coat 
lining), thread, and buttons (Goodwin 1962:112, 115,
118—121, 123-124, 129, 155-156).
Deserter descriptions from this same period do not 
suggest that the Williamsburg Store material produced a 
uniform appearance. An advertisement in the Virginia 
Gazette, May 2, 1777, lists a striped Virginia cloth coat
and breeches. On June 6, 1777, the Gazette advertised for a 
man wearing a short striped jacket. The Gazette of June 27, 
1777, lists a light colored coat and breeches (Lefferts 
1971:145).
The 1st State Line Regiment was serving with the 
Continental Army during the autumn of 177 8 and the 
winter/spring of 1779. Therefore, they received the issue 
of equipment from the Philadelphia Store. Not unlike the 
Virginia Line regiments they received stockings, shoes, 
shirts, coats, stocks and buckles, woolen caps, hats, 
waistcoats, and breeches. They also received cloth, linen 
thread, and buttons (PPS 1778-1779:23-24).
It is important that this regiment received much the 
same equipment as the other units as a deserter description 
in the Spring provides an excellent view of the uniform
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which may have been a result of the supplies issued from 
Philadelphia. The deserter wore a blue coat turned up red, 
red waistcoat, and breeches. This is the uniform specified 
in regulations. It can be assumed with some confidence that 
this was the appearance of the entire Virginia Line in the 
Spring of 1779.
2nd VIRGINIA STATE LINE REGIMENT
The 2nd Virginia State Line Regiment received their 
first issue from the Williamsburg Store in March, 1777 
(Goodwin 1962:115). Three companies received shoes and a 
variety of cloth and linen. Benjamin Spiller's Company 
received cloth specifically for coats and jackets and red 
cloth for facings (Goodwin 1962:136). Robert Lovell's 
Company was issued blue frieze for coats and large plain 
buttons (Goodwin 1962:141). It seems obvious the regiment 
was manufacturing, or having manufactured, blue coats faced 
red, the desired uniform for the Virginia soldier.
This model uniform is supported by a deserter 
description which appeared in the Virginia Gazette,
September 5, 1777. The soldier, from John Dudley's Company,
lists a blue coat turned up red (Lefferts 1971:145). This 
advertisement, only four months after the issue from the 
Williamsburg Stores, suggests this soldier is probably 
wearing the coat he received in Williamsburg.
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The 2nd received a substantial quantity of equipment 
from the Philadelphia Store in 1778-1779. They were issued 
shoes, stockings, shirts, neck stocks and buckles, 
waistcoats, hats, woolen caps, breeches, and coats. They 
received cloth, linen, thread, and buttons (PPS 
1778-1779:24-25). Their need seems to be equal with the 
other units. The evidence supports that the Williamsburg 
issued supplies certainly could not stand a full year of 
wear and tear. The winter of 1777-1778 was spent at Valley 
Forge and many accounts of the appearance of the men during 
that winter suggests that the equipment, new in the spring, 
was now no better than rags in the winter. This provides a 
hint as to the longevity of uniform clothing of the Virginia 
soldier.
THE CORPS OF LIGHT INFANTRY, 17 79
Virginia Line regiments provided a large portion of the 
the Light Infantry Brigade during the 177 9 campaign and 
documentation of this service is important to the discussion 
of the uniforms of the Virginia soldier. During the 
campaign season the Light Infantry was combined for special 
duty. In the Continental Army each regiment was to 
designate one company as its light company to be composed of 
its best soldiers, elite troops. This company would be 
detached to the Light Brigade or Light Corps.
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The Light Infantry would be recognized on the field by 
modifications to the regular uniform. The coat may be 
shorter and the cocked hat of the regular would be replaced 
by a leather cap decorated with a horsehair plume or other 
devise. American equipment shortages prevented major 
uniform changes. However, it seems the commander, Anthony 
Wayne, attempted to make the appearance of the Corps unique 
and this caused problems for the Virginians.
The Virginian's had received caps as members of the 
Light Corps but they fell short of regulations. The orderly 
book of the 1st Regiment of the Corps states on October 22, 
1779,
General Wayne has observed with great concern that 
the Virginians are the only troops in the Light 
Infantry that has not procured hair for their caps 
(Gamble 1892:250).
The concern for a properly decorated cap seems to be a 
small problem as the 1st Regiment's orderly book states on 
September 30, 177 9, that barefoot men are to be returned to 
the Army (Gamble 1892:256). This suggests that the shoes 
issued in quanity to the Virginians in early 1779 did not 
hold up for a campaign season.
The documentation indicates that the Virginia Regiments 
that served with the Continental Army received equal 
treatment from the state in regard to clothing supplies. It 
also seems that the state attempted to provide the 
regulation uniform and, if that was not possible, tried to 
see the men had something in terms of clothing.
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Where there are differences in uniforms between 
regiments the variety can be attributed to the location of 
the unit when supplies were available. Yet, even within a 
unit there was variation. A regiment viewed at two hundred 
yards might well seem uniform, at ten yards it would be 
apparent that no two men were alike. Differences in uniform 
color, cut, fabric, quality of construction, and personal 
modification was probably the norm.
If the documentation would allow, each company should 
be studied. Individual companies would be assigned to duty 
away from their regiments. This may have allowed them to 
acquire clothing that the rest of the regiment would not 
receive. Also the detached company could possibly miss 
receiving an issue made available to their regiment during 
their absence. This detached service may have caused more, 
or perhaps less, wear on the clothes than that experienced 
by the remainder of the unit.
Soldiers individually bought, sold, traded, and gambled 
for extra clothing. An issue of a new garment might require 
the soldier to produce a worn item to prove need. A 
competent "scrounger" might be well dressed and the 
individual next to him in the ranks might be in rags.
The appearance of the Virginia soldier in the 
Revolution changed over time. In order to understand how he 
was clothed a number of variables must be specified such as 
what period of the war and which regiment. The state of 
Virginia made every effort to equip her soldiers. There
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were times that clothing was adequate in quantity, and times 
of hardship. This hardship may be magnified through 
twentieth century eyes.
FIREARMS
The American Revolution, 1775-1883, is within a period 
of firearm technology which is dominated by the smoothbore 
flintlock musket. This applies to military and civilian 
weapons. This period extends from the beginning of the 
eighteenth century to the 1840's. The smoothbore musket 
replaced the pike or polearm as the standard infantry weapon 
and remained dominant until replaced by the caplock rifled 
musket.
The flintlock ignition system was developed c.1550 and 
for the next century and a haTf competed with the matchlock 
and wheel lock systems. The matchlock, which replaced the 
longbow and crossbow in warfare, was by comparison to the 
other two systems slow to fire, bulky in size, and 
undependable in bad weather. The wheel lock fired faster 
than a matchlock and was far more dependable. It rivaled 
the flintlock in this regard. However, it was a much more 
complicated mechanism and required precision in manufacture 
and maintenance (Neumann 1967:1-12).
The flintlock saw distinct stages in its development 
but by the middle of the seventeenth century had achieved 
the form that is found on the muskets of the American
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Revolution. Its function was the same as the other systems, 
to ignite a quantity of gunpowder which would propel a 
projectile. This was accomplished by loading the barrel of 
the firearm with a measured amount of gunpowder followed by 
a round lead ball which may be wrapped in cloth, leather, or 
paper to seal the area between the ball and the barrel wall. 
The ball and its wadding would be pressed tight against the 
powder charge with a rod.
The flintlock ignition system is mounted on the side of 
the firearm at the breech end of the barrel with the lock’s
pan in line with a small opening in the barrel called a
touch hole or vent which leads to the powder charge. A small 
quantity of gunpowder is put into the pan of the lock. When 
the trigger is pulled the cock is released and the flint
strikes the frizzen which produces a shower of sparks as it
opens the pan cover to expose the powder. The sparks ignite 
the powder in the pan, the flash travels through the vent 
igniting the main powder charge discharging the weapon.
Given good design, craftsmanship in manufacture, and a 
moderate amount of moisture in the air, this process, from 
trigger pull to discharge will appear instantaneous.
However, this may have been the exception rather than the 
rule.
The failure of the weapon to fire in the hands of a 
colonist hunting ducks or deer may have been inconvenient. 
The failure to fire in the hands of a soldier may have been 
fatal, for himself and his comrades. Where the colonist may
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have had his weapon produced by a local craftsman whose 
livelihood depended on the quality of his product, the 
soldier's weapon may have been produced under a government 
contract. Cost control dominated the production of the 
weapon and the reputation of the producer was of little 
consequence.
The potential problems of the military musket were 
offset by an additional piece of equipment and appropriate 
tactics employed by the armies of the period. The military 
musket was fitted with a bayonet to make it useful when it 
failed to operate for whatever reason. The bayonet was 
first introduced in a plug type. This was a metal blade 
with a round wood handle which was forced into the muzzle of 
the musket's barrel (Neumann 1967:48). This had two 
problems. The bayonet had to be removed if the musket was 
to be loaded and fired. Also, the bond between musket and 
bayonet was not sound. Movement of the musket or the use of 
the bayonet would affect its attachment to the musket.
An improvement was made in the bayonet by the 
introduction of the socket type. This was done by 
connecting the blade to a metal tube with a short piece of 
metal. This tube would fit over the muzzle of the barrel 
and could be made secure by the use of a groove in the tube 
engaging a metal lug welded to the barrel. The blade would 
then be parallel to the barrel but offset. This arrangement 
allowed the musket to be loaded and fired without removing 
the bayonet (Neumann 1967:48). The socket bayonet was the
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type which saw service in the Revolution. However, the plug 
bayonet may have been used early in the war. Civilian arms 
were pressed into service and the plug bayonet would be easy 
to adapt to these arms. Also, the rifle, which most often 
had an octagonal shape to the exterior of the barrel would 
not accept a socket bayonet which had to be turned to secure 
it to the weapon. The plug bayonet may have been used to 
offset this deficiency.
The effective use of the bayonet and the inherent 
inaccuracy of the musket dictated the tactics of the period. 
The massing of troops to concentrate the fire of the muskets 
or to present a "wall of steel" when relying on the bayonet, 
not unlike the pike which it replaced (Neumann 1967:14-15). 
It must be noted that the purpose of this study is to 
examine military material culture. Yet, the use of this 
material was aimed at destroying the morale of the 
opposition. Therefore, the ability of a soldier to 
withstand the effects of the opponent's weapons is as 
important, or more so, than the affect of his own. Although 
outside the scope of this paper, the morale of opposing 
forces must be a part of a more comprehensive study of this 
conflict.
The tactics of the Revolution, referred to as linear, 
were designed to take best advantage of the characteristics 
of the military musket. The opposing forces lined up facing 
each other in ranks two or three deep and fired in the 
general direction of the opponent. The musket may have had
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the range to send a ball 2 00 yards but it generally could 
not consistently hit a man at more than 80 yards. Muskets 
were not provided with a rear sight which is necessary for 
accuracy in aiming the weapon. Rather than drilling the 
soldier in shooting accurately, the soldier was drilled in 
speed of loading. The quantity of fire rather than the 
quality was considered the measure of a good army (Peterson 
1968:26-27).
The tactics dictated by the limitations of the 
flintlock muskets revolved around an attempt to bring a 
superior force, in numbers, against an inferior opponent. 
This equation will, of course, be modified by the ability, 
experience, and morale of the combatants. The advantage 
went to the British forces early in the war. However, the 
Americans began to demonstrate an ability to hold their own 
during the Battles at Saratoga, New York, in 1777. The 
Southern Campaign, 1780-1783, involved two opponents 
apparently equal.
Virginia and her sister states did show an ability to 
put soldiers in the field, but equipping the soldier with 
the tools to do his job was another matter. Firearms were a 
major problem. French assistance eased the problem in 1777. 
Yet, for the first two years of the war procurement of 
suitable weapons was Virginia's major supply problem.
There were four sources of supply available to the 
state. Some volunteers brought a personal weapon with them. 
There were weapons captured in armories and early battles.
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Virginia, like other states, contracted with local craftsmen 
to produce weapons in quantity and encouraged a fledgling 
weapons industry. Finally, the state attempted to purchase 
firearms in Europe (Goodwin 1962:162. Neumann 1967:22).
All of these sources produced weapons for the Virginia 
soldier. Although the results may have met the initial 
problem of supplying the soldier with a gun, the variety of 
weapons were a supply nightmare. Ammunition supply had to 
service barrel bore diameters which ranged between .65 and 
.80 inches. Although a musket is much more forgiving in the 
tolerances between bore and ball size than a rifle, the Army 
Quartermaster had a problem. Also, spare parts were needed 
from time to time. Interchangeable parts were, of course, 
not available. In order to fit a part on a flintlock the 
armorer first had to have a part that approximated the part 
to be replaced. The supplies had to include parts for 
British, Dutch, German, and locally produced weapons.
Colonial militia custom required that every man provide 
his own equipment, this included a firearm. Therefore, it 
can be assumed that many personal arms were to be found in 
the camps at the beginning of the war. These weapons were 
for hunting, although they may have served a self defense 
role in the western Virginia counties and for Virginians 
that were exploring further west. Many of the soldiers who 
lived in the western counties favored rifles rather than 
smoothbore weapons. The rifle will be discussed later.
These personal weapons presented a wide variety of
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types. Long barreled fowling guns, or fowlers, designed to 
be loaded with shot for duck or goose hunting were probably 
found among the men from tidewater counties. Locally 
produced arms with a mixture of colonial produced and 
European parts might be found in any part of the state, as 
might obsolete military muskets and economically produced 
weapons for the Indian trade. A well-to-do gentleman would 
provide his own fusil, a proportionally smaller version of a 
military musket mounted with silver or other fine metal 
parts.
These weapons presented the ammunition and parts supply 
problem mentioned above. The riflemen often manufactured 
their own ammunition with a bullet mold provided by the 
riflemaker (Peterson 1968:74). This required the 
quartermaster to stock lead bars. The problem of 
appropriate ammunition was not exclusive to personal arms, 
many men enlisted with no equipment (Goodwin 1962:5).
The state encouraged a manufactory at Fredricksburg and 
contracted with individuals to produce muskets (Goodwin 
1962:162). Gunsmithing is a skilled endeavor and the needs 
of a civilian population cannot compare with the emergency 
at the beginning of the war. The records are sketchy as to 
how well local production met demand. However, it is 
doubtful if there were enough skilled individuals to produce 
a small fraction of the need. The only firearm supply that 
could address the need of Virginia and the rest of the 
states was where firearm manufacturing had been an ongoing
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activity, in Europe.
Virginia was not alone in the need for firearms. Other 
states and the Continental Congress had agents scouring 
Europe for guns. There was some success as the Virginia 
Gazette, August 9 and November 20, 177 6, records two
shipments arriving in 177 6. These references unfortunately 
do not state the origin of the muskets. A secondary source, 
however, provides an undated reference to 2100 firearms 
reaching Williamsburg from Rotterdam (Brown 1980:320). This 
may indicate purchase of Dutch firearms by the State.
Documentary Evidence
A popular concept concerning the American soldiers in 
the Revolution is that they were undersupplied and what they 
did have in the way of equipment was of questionable 
quality. This concept has "myth11 qualities, the rag-tag 
Continental facing the well equipped British professional. 
There is, like all myths, some truth to this view. The 
British soldier was, at most times, better supplied, 
although the quality of his equipment, including firearms, 
was only comparable to the Americans. He was a better 
soldier than the American at the beginning of the war, 
judged by European standards and the practice of military 
science in the eighteenth century.
At the beginning of the war the Americans, Virginians
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included, faced shortages of all war materials. As is 
discussed throughout this paper, Virginia used whatever was 
at hand to put troops into the field. This is especially 
true of firearms. The qualities of the standard military 
muskets are discussed above, as are general sources of 
supply. Now specific references to firearms will be 
examined to determine what sort of firearm was used by the 
soldier of the Virginia Continental Line.
The state's need was met in a number of ways. As 
stated earlier many men brought their own weapons especially 
the men from the west where a firearm was an important 
survival tool. The need for a firearm in the settled east 
was less, and there were perhaps new immigrants and young 
men who did not have the financial ability to provide 
themselves with a musket.
The Virginians captured a few weapons at the Battle of 
Great Bridge in December 177 5. Among the captured arms 
retained for the army by Colonel Woodford were thirty "well 
fixed" muskets and two silver mounted fuzees (VG, December 
16, 1775). The muskets might have been either the English 
manufactured Long Land or Short Land pattern, both were 
being used by the British Army at this time. The fuzees 
were a shorter lighter version of the military musket. The 
silver mountings mark these as officer's weapons, privately 
furnished.
Virginians were also involved in the Christmas Day 
attack on the German troops garrisoning Trenton, New Jersey.
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At this engagement 1000 muskets were captured (Smith 
1976:822). It seems reasonable that deficiencies in arms 
among Washington's soldiers were made up from these stores. 
This may have included Virginians.
Virginia also looked to arms produced in the colonies. 
Between September 17 7 5 and July 177 6 the Virginia Committee 
of Safety purchased 3325 muskets and 2098 rifles (Gill 
1974:34). These purchases may account for the six wagons 
from Pennsylvania mentioned earlier as that state and 
Massachusetts were among the largest producers of arms. 
Pennsylvania contractors received orders for 4500 stand of 
arms between October 1, 1775 and April 30, 1776 (Brown 
1980:309).
Contracts were also made within Virginia. On September 
28, 177 6 2 00 stands of arms were ordered from the Hunter 
Iron Works, previously known as Rappahannock Forge, in 
Falmouth, Virginia. In addition there were a number of 
other works around the state. The record of production by 
Virginia's gun makers is unclear. However, there was a 
continuing demand; and they did supply what they could. 
Hunter's and the Virginia State Factory, at the junction of 
the James and Rivanna Rivers, were still operating until the 
invasions of 1780-1781. Virginia established a new arsenal 
at Point of Forks in 1783, which operated until 1803 (Brown 
1980:313) .
These multiple sources of arms seems to have been 
sufficient to allow Virginians to take the field in the
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North with Washington. Although they had weapons, the 
supply of suitable ammunition, as well as spare parts, as 
mentioned earlier, continued. The situation is illustrated 
by an order issued by a Virginia Regiment:
June 25, 1776 
The Capts. in command of each company are desired 
instantly to give in an exact account of their arms 
and accoutraments, whether they be musquets or 
common small guns, the number of rifles fit or unfit 
for duty, how they are fixed for molds, and c. ; in 
short to give as an exact account as possible of the 
weakness of our regiment (Stubblefield 
1887:186-187).
The most interesting word in this order is weakness. 
This does not necessarily mean shortage. The weakness in 
Stubblefield's estimation may well be the mix of weapons and 
the condition. He refers to muskets, common guns (civilian 
weapons), and rifles. The characteristics of these weapons 
is discussed in this chapter's introduction. This officer 
and his peers were becoming more proficient with the 
standard linear tactics, at least in drill. These tactics 
called for reliance on the musket with bayonet. Common guns 
and rifles did not have the capacity to mount a bayonet. 
Consequently, if facing a equal number of enemy, 
Stubblefield's command might have held their own in a 
shooting battle. They might have been superior if the 
tactics were limited to firing, considering they had rifles. 
If, however, the battle was to be decided in the accepted 
fashion, the bayonet charge, the Virginians were weak 
indeed.
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This situation was not isolated to one regiment. In 
October 177 6, General Stephens requested muskets to replace 
rifles in the 4th Virginia Regiment (Sanchez-Saavedra 
1978:42). The 11th Virginia was commanded by Daniel Morgan 
who led the first Virginians, riflemen, north to Boston in 
1775. There were, undoubtedly, a large proportion of rifles 
in his command.
In 1777 Washington had a Corps of Riflemen formed under 
the command of Morgan. This was an attempt to use the 
rifles in a role that suited their characteristics, long 
range shooting with accuracy, but with the protection of 
Line troops when threatened with enemy bayonets. 
Unfortunately, the problems in the Line regiments plagued 
Morgan at the beginning.
13 June 1777
Rifles are to be given to Morgan's corps for muskets if not 
enough they are to exchange or purchase private property 
(Heth 1892:357).
It can be assumed that the problems confronting the 
regiments mentioned above were shared by other Virginia 
units. A noticeable improvement occurred when the imported 
French muskets reached the army.
When the Virginia Line surrendered with the Charleston 
garrison in May 1780 it gave up its arms. British records 
show that 5500 men surrendered 5416 French muskets 
(Taliferro 1980:34-35). It must be concluded that at this 
point in time the Virginians were armed in large part, if 
not completely, with French muskets. The problem remains to
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determine when they first received these arms and what 
firearm did the French musket replace.
France was the major supplier of muskets for the
Americans. It is estimated that 102,000 muskets were
received from France between 177 6 and 1781. Although the
quantity is large the quality may be questioned, if for no
other reason than the French probably sent a variety of
models of their obsolete military muskets. There were
possibly nine different models shipped: M1717, M1728, M1746,
M17 54, M1763, M1766, and M1768 (Butler 1971:27-28).
Although these model numbers indicate the year in which a
particular design was accepted, individual arms might not
have conformed to the ideal. The mixture of models and the
differences in quality is reflected in a letter from General
Nathanael Greene to George Washington:
A Brigg arrived this day from Nantz [Nantes]. Her 
cargo consists of 272 Chests of arms containing 
6800, sixty chest of which not being fully proved, 
the Capt. says he cannot so fully engage for their 
goodness, but the remaining 212 chests are very fine 
proved arms. Also, 1500 excellent double bridled 
locks (Greene 2, 1980:48).
Greene served for a time as Quartermaster General and 
as a field commander. Washington had great confidence in 
him and his record in each position is commendable. His 
opinion concerning these arms can be accepted with 
confidence. His reference to double bridled locks and very 
fine proved arms might indicate later model muskets, most 
likely M1763.
The French arms, after arrival, had to be delivered to
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the army and transportation difficulties caused some delay. 
The ships from France would naturally seek a port of least 
resistance from the British Navy. The navy would be 
attempting to intercept these supplies. The navy, however, 
had the added responsibility of supporting the army. 
Consequently, the majority of naval vessels were in waters 
near the conflicting armies: New York City, New Jersey, and 
eastern Pennsylvania. This is supported by records of 
shipments to Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and Williamsburg, 
Virginia.
Portsmouth is the most frequently mentioned port of 
delivery. 41,680 French muskets were delivered here between 
October 1776, and December 1777 (Brown 1980:319). In March 
1777, a vessel reached Portsmouth with 12,000 muskets (WGW 
7, 1932:216). 11,987 were delivered in April 1777 (Brown
1980:319). These two deliveries account for half the total 
received through Portsmouth.
Philadelphia was closer to the normal area of 
operations of Washington's army. Shipments arriving here 
would make delivery of the muskets and other supplies to the 
troops much easier. The problem was that getting to 
Philadelphia would have been much more dangerous for the 
vessels as Royal Navy activity would have been heavier on 
the mid Atlantic coast. This activity was not only to 
intercept supplies for the colonists but also to protect the 
supplies for the British army from American privateers.
The risk seems to have been worthwhile. Between
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February 177 6, and February 177 9, 14,156 muskets were 
delivered to Philadelphia (Brown 1980:319). Washington 
notes that 11,000 were in Philadelphia in March 1777 (WGW 7, 
1932:216). The importance of this city as a supply port may 
have been one of the reasons for the British campaign of the 
fall of 1777 to capture it. The British abandoned it in the 
spring of 1778 and returned to New York City.
French and other European arms were not being shipped 
exclusively to northern ports. The Virginia Gazette 
periodically reports the arrival of arms and other supplies 
in nearby waters. On March 21, 1777 a ship arrived in the
James River from Nantes with 1500 stands of arms. Again on 
April 4 of the same year the brig Sally arrived with 10,000 
stand of arms and gun locks. A French warship and two
merchant vessels from Rochefort arrived on May 29, 1778 with
arms and dry goods. There were, undoubtedly, other 
shipments direct from Europe, from Europe via the Caribbean, 
and from the activity of privateers.
The abundance of good harbors and a intercoastal
waterway on the Atlantic coast produced an active water- 
based shipping trade early in American history. This was to 
the detriment of a road system. Unfortunately, during the 
Revolution the waterways, as mentioned above, were the 
domain of the Royal Navy. This made overland shipment of 
arms and other supplies necessary. Transportation may have 
been the major reason for lack of supply to the army rather 
than inept administrators and inefficient contractors.
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The potential transportation problem can be illustrated 
by considering the movement of muskets from the coast to the 
army. References of numbers of chests of arms to total arms 
place the number of muskets per chest between 2 5 and 32. If 
the smaller number is used and the weight of a musket is 10 
pounds then, with the weight of a stout wood container, each 
chest would be in excess of 2 50 pounds. A conservative 
estimate of the size of each chest (62" by 18" by 18") would 
allow perhaps 12 chests per wagon. It is questionable if a 
wagon could support one and one-half tons. It presents a 
larger problem when the quality of colonial roads is 
considered. It is perhaps more realistic to consider a 
wagon load at half the size or six chests or 150 muskets. 
This would supply one, understrength, regiment. This, plus 
other supplies such as food, ammunition, and uniforms, must 
have made transporting supplies a major problem.
The arms supplies from France peaked in early 1777.
This abundance seems to have reached the Virginia Line late 
in the summer of that year. An order issued by General 
George Weedon to his Brigade of Virginia Line, in August of 
1777, to return chests for extra arms suggests that arms 
have been issued recently and the remaining need for extra 
arms suggests that present needs have been filled (Weedon 
1971:26). The time of Weedon1s order strongly indicates 
that his brigade received French muskets. The army made an 
effort to keep uniformity of firearms within related army 
units. Consequently, it is probable that the the other
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Virginia Brigades received French muskets. Washington 
issued orders to have each brigade or division be armed with 
weapons of the same size bore, "as many happy consequences
would flow from it" (WGW 9, 1933:363).
The winter of 1777-1778 must have been hard on firearms 
as well as the soldiers. In May of 1778 Washington 
requested that the Commissary of Military Stores in 
Springfield, Massachusetts, send 2000 arms, as "The distress 
of this Army for want of arms is very great." A postscript
requests, "Let 1000 more arms be packed up, to be sent on,
on orders being given" (WGW 11, 1934:409).
The next day Washington writes to the President of 
Congress:
I think the Arms and Clothing expected from France, 
should be brought forward without a moments delay 
after they arrive.... Our distress is amazingly 
great. We have many men without firelocks, and many 
coming in, in the same predicament. (WGW 11,
1934:416).
This seems to indicate that new recruitment is causing 
part of the supply shortage.
The problems were apparently solved, as there is no 
mention of similar problems in Washington 's writings or 
other records. The problems of late 1778, and early 1779, 
centered on clothing. There is little reference to arms 
problems in the Virginia Line until the surrender at 
Charleston in 1780.
Virginia's commitment to the war effort after the loss 
of the state's regiments at Charleston faced many problems.
80
Perhaps the largest was that the war had come to Virginia's 
soil. British troops raided supply locations, destroyed 
manufactories, and chased the government for much of 1780 
and 1781. During this period Virginia attempted to recruit 
replacement troops, supply them, and supply detachments 
under Von Steuben and LaFayette who had been sent south to 
do what they could against the British. In addition to
defending herself, Virginia was asked to furnish men to the
small army in the South under General Horatio Gates and 
later Nathanael Greene.
The problems facing Virginia's "Government on the run", 
also resulted in limited records. What is available shows 
that arms supplies became short during this period. Prior 
to the problems of 1780-1781 there was a good supply of arms
in the state. The Virginia Board of War reported on August
28, 1779, that 5000 imported stands of arms had been
retained in Virginia (PTJ 3, 1951:78). In January 1781, the
picture had changed. Jefferson's papers show that the
supply in magazines had dwindled to 68 (PTJ 4,
1951:470-471).
As was the case early in the war, supply of arms
amounted to make do with what was available. In March 1782,
William Davies, who commanded Virginia's military effort, 
wrote to the Governor requesting that General Von Steuben be 
required to return the arms furnished him when he was 
operating in Virginia in 1780-1781 (CVSP 3, 1968:86). He 
suggests that these be replaced with those captured at
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Yorktown in 1781. These arms were, of course, British, and 
having a different bore size would have brought on the old 
problem of ammunition supply. Fortunately for the 
Virginians, this was late in the conflict and had no effect.
The firearms used by the Virginia soldier can be 
divided into three periods. The period of uniformity,
1777-1780, due to French supply is sandwiched between two 
periods of making do with what was at hand. The greatest 
variety of arms is found at the beginning of the war. The 
problems connected with this variety of arms, and the 
solving of these problems by the availability of the French 
musket, had a lasting affect on Virginia and the nation.
This affect will be discussed at the end of this study.
ACCOUTREMENTS
Cartridge Boxes, Shot Pouches
The ammunition system familiar to the colonists was a 
powder horn and a shot pouch. The weapon, rifle or musket, 
was loaded by pouring powder from the horn into a measure, 
the measure was then emptied in to the barrel of the weapon, 
and the powder was followed by a ball or shot. The ball 
would be wrapped in a wad, a piece of cloth, which would 
fill the space between the ball and the barrel wall. This 
provided a gas seal and held the ball in the barrel. If 
shot was used it would be "sandwiched" between wads.
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Regardless of which projectile system was used, it was 
seated firmly upon the powder charge. The amount of powder, 
type of wadding, and type and size of projectile were 
dependent on the individual weapon and the task to be 
performed.
The ammunition system used by the military was 
different. The soldier was supplied with paper cartridges 
that included the powder, ball, and wadding. The cartridge 
was a tube of paper sealed at each end. The soldier had to 
rip the cartridge open with his teeth, pour a small amount 
of the powder into the priming pan on the lock, pour the 
remainder of the powder into the muskets barrel, and ram the 
ball, with the cartridge paper acting as wadding, on top of 
the powder charge (Peterson 1968:24-26). This system was 
faster than the system employed by a hunter, as described 
above. However, it had a negative affect on the accuracy of 
the weapon. As discussed earlier, the tactics of the period 
were designed to emphasize rate of fire rather than 
accuracy. To the hunter turned soldier this may have been 
viewed as a waste of ammunition, an expensive commodity.
Many of these soldiers were armed with rifles and the paper 
cartridge system was unsuitable for this weapon.
Another drawback to paper cartridges were their 
susceptibility to dampness. The paper provided only minimal 
protection to the powder and damp powder was useless. To 
solve this problem the soldier carried his ammunition in a 
leather cartridge box. Its design was based on two
83
functional requirements, to protect the cartridges from the 
environment, while providing easy access to the ammunition 
to maintain speed in loading the musket.
The requirements for the cartridge box allowed for some 
variety, but a quality box would feature some standard 
attributes. The box was a rectangular bag cut and sewn to 
accommodate a wood block, which had holes drilled in it to 
hold the paper cartridges. There was a thin leather flap, 
one side of which was sewn to the body of the box in a way 
to allow the flap to lay on the top of the cartridges. There 
was an outer flap which extended over the ends of the box 
and across the face of the box. This flap could be secured 
to the box by a tab attached to the flap which could be 
fixed to a button on the bottom of the box. The outer flap 
was shaped in such a way that even when not fastened it 
would remained closed (Peterson 1968:64-69).
The documentation and examples which will be reviewed 
demonstrate that the Virginians of the Continental Line did 
adopt the cartridge box. The exact type used, however, is 
open to speculation. It is also obvious that the well 
constructed box, described above, was rare.
The first method of keeping ammunition on the soldier's 
person was the familiar powderhorn and shot pouch. Although 
horns are not mentioned in the Williamsburg Public Store 
Record, it can be assumed they were used, as the companion 
shot pouches appear repeatedly in the early part of the 
record. Twill and duck, heavy canvas materials, were often
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issued for the purpose of making shot pouches between 
October 12 and November 13, 1775. Whether this material was
to make up deficiencies, as many men must have brought their 
own equipment, or if some companies were striving for 
uniformity is not clear (Goodwin 1962:159-160).
The system soon changed. An order for various items to 
William Lux and Company on December 13, 177 5, included 
cartridge paper (Goodwin 1962:160). It is possible that 
pouches were used for paper cartridges; however, they would 
not provide the protection afforded by the leather cartridge 
boxes. Probably the Virginians used a variety of methods to 
keep their ammunition. An order issued on March 18, 1776, 
asks for the number of cartouch boxes, powderhorns, and shot 
pouches that are needed (Stubblefield 1887:155). The only 
mention of cartridge boxes in the Williamsburg Store is on 
April 10, 1777. A listing for the magazine is an entry for
200 cartouch boxes (Goodwin 1962:161). It would appear the 
cartridge boxes used by the soldiers of the Virginia Line 
were supplied by the Continental Army.
The Continental Army also used a tin cannister to carry 
ammunition. This was a simple rectangular tin container 
with a hinged lid whose edges fit over the body of the box. 
This provided a relatively waterproof container. The 
quality of this box is illustrated by an order of General 
Weedon noting the use of the tin ammunition canteens for 
other purposes (Weedon 1971:56). These other purposes are 
revealed in court action against Lt. Rains of the 15th
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Virginia for sending a soldier to bring water in a tin 
cartridge box (Weedon 1971:98).
The tin box had no divider and the cartridges were laid 
on top of one another. This would have not answered for the 
quick access to the ammunition provided by the leather 
cartridge box. The tin box, although possibly used for the 
soldier's primary supply of ammunition, was designed for an 
auxiliary supply. An extra supply of ammunition would be 
especially important to troops on detached service away from 
the army's regular supply system. On July 25, 1779, 
Washington ordered that ammunition cannisters be delivered 
to the Light Infantry (WGW 15, 1936:476). During the 1779
campaign the Light Infantry operated independently, 
including its assault on the British fortifications at Stony 
Point, New York.
Virginians made up a large portion of the Light 
Infantry in 1779 and would have used the tin boxes. This 
was, however, not their first use of this piece of 
equipment. On September 1, 1777, Weedon ordered that 278
tin boxes for extra cartridges be divided between 
Muhlenberg's and Weedon's brigades (Weedon 1971:27). On 
September 25, 1777 Weedon ordered that the men were to carry
only their cartridge boxes and tin cannisters full (Weedon 
1971:60). This suggests that the soldiers may have carried 
cartridges in their haversacks. Having both types of boxes 
may not have been the norm throughout the Army. An order 
from Washington on October 13, 1777, calls for tin
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cannisters to be taken away from men with cartridge boxes to 
supply the men with none (WGW 9, 1933:363).
The men with the tin boxes may have been reluctant to
give them up. They provided a reasonable assurance of
usable ammunition. The quality of the leather boxes was
always suspect. Timothy Pickering the Adjutant General of
the Army remarked on this problem in September of 1777: 
Having been under arms nearly all day during an 
incessant rain, the ammunition and the cartridge 
boxes (which are badly made) was spoiled. This 
obliged us to keep out of striking distance but as 
near to the enemy as was compatible with that object 
until the army could safely encamp and make up 
musket cartridges. This occasioned two or three 
night marches (Wright 1963:69).
Washington was probably reacting to the same concern
when he wrote to the Board of War three months earlier:
Be pleased to send on all the Tin Cartridge 
Cannisters and have as many more made as possible, 
they will save an immense amount of ammunition (WGW 
8, 1933:272-273).
Washington's concern over the quality of the cartridge
boxes continued, as is evident from the following letters.
On October 13, 1777, he wrote to the President of Congress:
None but the best and thickest (leather)... small 
inner flap.... the flaps in general, are too small 
and do not project sufficiently over the ends or the 
sides of the boxes (WGW 9, 1933:366).
To the Board of War, November 3, 1777:
Lining the flap with painted canvas will certainly 
be of service, considering the badness and thinness 
of the leather in general; but the greatest 
preservative to the cartridges, is a small inside 
flap of pliant leather, which lays close upon them 
and not only keeps them dry but from being rubbed 
(WGW 9, 1933:497).
The campaign of 1778 saw the quality of the cartridge
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boxes was secondary to the problem of availability. Again
Washington writes to the Board of War on June 6, 1778: ...
we are exceedingly distressed for Cartouch Boxes.
By an exact return made a few days ago 17 00 were 
wanting for the new recruits, and to replace old 
ones,... (WGW 12, 1934:25).
Washington in a letter to General William Maxwell on
August 13, 1778, states the situation clearly: "Commissary
of Military Stores has no cartrouch boxes or tin cannisters"
(WGW 12, 1934:318).
It may be that necessity is the mother of invention, or
at least production. At least one factory in Philadelphia
was turning out 60-70 boxes per day in the spring of 1779
(WGW 15, 1936:158). It would seem that this rate of
production and the general inactivity of the Army in 1779
would have contributed to the easing of concern connected to
the availability of cartridge boxes.
The problem that remains is to understand what style of
cartridge box was carried by soldiers of the Virginia Line.
There is no description or other identification of any
particular model. The only clue available from the
documentation is the number of rounds issued to each
soldier. Since the individual cartridge was susceptible to
damage from various causes, it seems likely that the
soldiers were only issued a quantity of ammunition that
could be accommodated in the cartridge box.
A division order and general order issued by General
Weedon on September 13, 1777, calls for each man to get 40
rounds and extra ammunition to be carried in such a way to
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prevent injury and loss (Weedon 1971:46, 48-49). Does the
issue of 4 0 rounds correspond to the capacity of a box?
Some of the men had tin cannisters in addition to the 
leather box. The tin cannisters had a capacity of 3 6 
rounds. The wooden block in a leather box had from 9 to 3 6 
holes for cartridges (Neumann and Kravic 1975:66,67). It 
would appear the tin cannisters were considered in orders 
for ammunition issues at this particular time. Yet, on 
January 26, 1778, Weedon again issues an order for 4 0 rounds 
to be issued to each man (Weedon 1971:209). This comes 
after an order on January 10, 1778 to return all tin
cannisters (Weedon 1971:189).
The Virginia soldier used a tin cannister through much 
of the war in addition to the regular leather cartridge box. 
The cannister, it appears, came in only one variety. The 
leather box may have been of local manufacture, a French 
import, or a captured British or German box. Ammunition 
issue is the only clue to the style of the box based on 
capacity. The box of the soldier probably changed through 
the war. The first boxes were simple militia boxes adequate 
for short periods of service. These may have been followed 
by captured boxes and French imports. Evidence suggests 
that later in the war Continental production supplied the 
need. It seems probable that, like clothing and other 
equipment, there may very we11 have been a mixture of 
cartridge box styles within a regiment.
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Bayonets
An order from the state of Virginia for 2 00 "stands of 
arms" specified that this included a bayonet (Goodwin 
1962:162). The nature of eighteenth century warfare would 
allow the assumption that military muskets, regardless of 
source, had a bayonet as part of a "stand of arms". There 
was not, it appears, a shortage of bayonets except in the 
winter/spring of 1778. Weedon complained of deficiencies of 
bayonets on January 17 (Weedon 1971:194). On March 20 
Washington wrote to the Board of War concerning the problem 
but he also says that the army is manufacturing its own (WGW 
11, 1934:112). Fabricating a bayonet would not be a problem
for a blacksmith.
If shortages did occur it may have not have been in the 
number of bayonets available in stores but rather a proper 
bayonet for a particular musket. As with other spare parts 
one size did not fit all. However, minor adjustments could 
easily be made by an army artificer.
Another reason for need may have resulted from breakage 
due to improper use. The bayonet was used as a screwdriver 
(Taliferro 1980:74). It would certainly serve to hold a 
hunk of meat over a cook fire. The effect of this heating 
may have made the metal quite brittle, and when the bayonet
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was used as a pry bar to open a box or barrel it could 
easily break.
The bayonet design was, like the musket, unique to its 
place of manufacture. Therefore, if the musket used by the 
Virginia soldier can be identified the bayonet style will 
likewise be identified. Probably, there were locally made 
replacements for lost or broken bayonets used on imported 
muskets. This diversity is probably no greater for bayonets 
than any other piece of equipment.
OTHER EQUIPMENT
The soldier of the Virginia Line regiments had access 
to all the material culture of the period. Some of this was • 
military issue, uniform, musket, bayonet, cartridge box, 
belts, haversack, knapsack, and canteen. Other items, 
obtained by the soldier individually, or perhaps issued by 
the military, were procured from civilian vendors and did 
not differ from the item available to the civilian 
population. This group of items includes razors, combs, 
writing materials, eating utensils, gaming equipment, etc.
The documentation available only lists the items. Type and 
style is open to conjecture.
Haversacks
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The haversack was the soldiers pocket and was with him 
at all times. He kept his personal possessions in his 
haversack. Also, if the army was on the move, food would be 
prepared and kept in the haversack to eat on the move or if 
cooking fires could not be used.
The haversack was a simple rectangular bag made of 
linen. They appear in the Williamsburg Public Store record 
as an end use for material being issued (Goodwin 1962:22,
90). The simplicity of the item would make it possible for 
the soldier to fabricate his own haversack, and it could 
have been constructed from used material such as worn 
clothing or tents.
Knapsacks
The material used in haversacks was also used for 
knapsacks (Goodwin 1962:159-161) The knapsack was for the 
soldier's extra clothing. The knapsack was slung on the 
back by a single or double strap. If the army needed to 
move quickly the men might leave their knapsacks, which 
followed in wagons. Although they were designed so the 
soldier could fight while wearing his knapsack, it was often 
removed if action was expected. An order issued by Weedon 
on October 3, 1777, while trailing the British army marching
in Philadelphia, calls for the men to leave their packs 




The Virginia Gazette, October 7, 1775, had an 
advertisement by William Aylett, a contractor for the army, 
which included a request for large quantities of ducking or 
russia drab for tents (Goodwin 1962:8). The Williamsburg 
Public Store record has numerous references to tents from 
1775-1779 (Goodwin 1962:208). As with other items, it 
appears that the state made an attempt to provide its troops 
with shelter.
References to tents usually involve the number of men 
assigned to each tent. General Heth, at one point, was able 
to provide a tent for every five men (Heth 1892:340).
Weedon, however, had to have eight men to each tent. It 
should be noted that probably two of the eight would be on 
guard or other duty.
Cookware and Foodservice
The advertisement, referred to above, by William Aylett 
also calls for kettles. It specifies tin or brass (Goodwin 
1962:8). The Williamsburg Store record has numerous 
references to these items being purchased and issued
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(Goodwin 1962:183-185). Iron pots were not sought in the 
advertisement, perhaps because of weight. The Williamsburg 
Store record does show, however, they were purchased and 
issued (Goodwin 1962:184).
The kettles came in various sizes. The ideal, it 
seems, was a two gallon size that would feed six men 
(Jefferson 3, 1951:240, 302). Evidence that kettles
continued to be used by Virginians in the war is 
substantiated by Weedon (Weedon 1971:20, 219).
Kettles appear to be the only issued item connected 
with food preparation or consumption. There is only one 
reference to forks and spoons being issued from Williamsburg 
and that was to an artillery company (Goodwin 1962:143). 
These items, as well as, plates, cups, and bowls, if used, 
were the soldier's responsibility. This, undoubtedly, 
resulted in great diversity in these items.
Canteens
The Aylett advertisement calls for canteens and they 
were issued from the Williamsburg Store (Goodwin 1962:8,
160, 161). Canteens were commonly made of wood; however, 
tin was also used (Neumann and Kravic 1975:59-64). Glass 
bottles may have been used and possibly covered with leather 
or other material for protection.
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Blankets
Blankets were an item provided by the state. Blankets 
are mentioned in the Williamsburg record and in the 
Philadelphia Public Store record as being issued to every 
regiment of the Virginia Line (Goodwin 1962:168-172; PPS
1778-1779:9, 12-25). The blankets were probably a variety
of colors and styles depending on the source and the 
material available to the manufacturer.
Razors and Combs
These items were shipped from Williamsburg and made
available through the Philadelphia Store (Goodwin
1962:148-149; PPS 1778-1779:9, 12-25). The combs were made
of horn, ivory, bone, tortoiseshell, brass, pewter, and
close grain wood (Neumann and Kravic 1975:89). It can be
assumed that these items were made available to the soldier
with an end use in mind, although the frequency of the use
is questionable. The Light Infantry Orderly Book recorded,
...the soldiers who mount guard coming on guard with 
long beards and unpowdered and other the powder 




Hunting Shirts (Figure la.)
Hunting shirt is the term most used in the 
documentation in reference to an outer garment for the upper 
part of the body. The term rifle shirt, rifle frock, or 
hunting frock may appear in primary or secondary sources to 
describe an identical garment. The hunting shirt was 
subject to modification using a combination of three major 
characteristics: length, fringe, and front opening (Neumann 
and Kravic 1975:242-243). Regardless of the design the 
function remained the same.
It appears Virginia, at the beginning of the 
Revolution, was unable to provide the soldiers with the 
standard military coat and the hunting shirt was substituted 
(Goodwin 1962:viii-ix). It was simple to construct, 
comfortable, and if dyed a dark color, it would provide the 
soldier with camouflage in the woods. It was recognized as 
the common dress of riflemen and this had an additional 
benefit.
Washington urged its adoption because of its 
practicality and economy, and because "it is a dress which 









who think every such person a complete marksman" (Huddleston 
1978:16).
The hunting shirt can be documented as being used by 12 
of the 15 Virginia Line Regiments. It can be assumed that 
the remaining three had the garment. The 11th Virginia, not 
mentioned in the documentation as having hunting shirts, was 
commanded by Daniel Morgan. Morgan was best known for 
commanding special rifle detachments, and it seems likely 
that at least some of the men of his regiment would have 
been riflemen or adopted the dress of the riflemen. The 
other regiments who are not mentioned as receiving hunting 
shirts are the 13th and 15th Virginia. These regiments were 
raised during the same period as the 12th and 14th Regiments 
who were issued this garment or the linen material for it 
(Lefferts 1971:144). It seems likely the 13th and 15th 
Regiments received a similar issue.
Although it is clear that hunting shirts were used by 
soldiers of the Virginia Line, details concerning the style 
are vague, limited, in most cases, to color. Yellow 
appeared on a member of the 1st Virginia, brown on a soldier 
of the 2nd, black in the 6th, almost black in the 7th, and 
white in the 14th (VG, May 23, 1777; Lefferts 1971:141-144).
Material of contrasting colors was used on the 
collars/capes and cuffs to provide a specific identity to 
individual regiments. Red wool was issued to the 1st 
Virginia for this purpose (Goodwin 1962:32). The hunting 
shirts of the 6th Regiment were to have white cuffs for
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sergeants and dark cuffs for drummers (Goodwin 1962:11).
The length and decoration, like the color, varied from 
unit to unit. The 6th Virginia was to have a short, plain 
shirt (Goodwin 1962:711). The 7th Virginia had at least one 
member with a fringed shirt (Lefferts 1971:143). The 
apparent variety in this garment prohibits a single model 
for illustration.
In order to describe this garment it will be divided 
into two types. The hunting shirt is a garment that is 
opened only a short distance in the front and is put on over 
the head. The hunting, or rifle, frock is open in front for 
its full length and is put on like a jacket.
The first variable characteristic is length. The frock 
may have been short extending only to the hips or may have 
terminated below the knees. The shirt, not open in front, 
would probably have been mid-thigh length at the extreme.
If it was any longer it would have constricted movement.
The second variable is the use of capes and fringe. 
These elements could have been used on either type, 
depending on regulations, availability of material, and 
personal preference. Although decorative, capes and fringe 
served a functional purpose. The capes gave extra 
protection to the shoulders and the fringe helped "channel" 
the water from the garment, acting like a wick.
Also of interest is that the garment is from a civilian 
rather than a military tradition. This is revealed in the 
narrative of a Massachusetts militiaman, Simeon Alexander,
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in his pension application. He comments on Daniel Morgan's 
riflemen. His reference to Morgan's regiment should not be 
understood to be the 11th Virginia. Morgan, at this time,
was leading a company of riflemen who he had recruited and
marched north to join the army besieging the British in 
Boston.
The uniform of Morgan's regiment was a short frock 
made of pepper-and-salt colored cotton cloth like a 
common frock worn by our country people, except that
it was short and open before, to be tied with
strings, pantaloons of the same fabric and color, 
and some kind of cap, but I do not now remember as 
to its form (Dann 1980:106).
It is doubtful if the material was cotton. Oznaburg, a 
course linen material, is regularly mentioned as the 
material of choice for hunting shirts or frocks. The 
reference to the garment being short should not suggest that 
this was usual. Four illustrations of the period showing 
soldiers in frocks depict one as waist length, two mid 
thigh, and one below the knee (Huddleston 1978:62-64, 66).
Perhaps the only surviving example of a Revolutionary 
War rifle frock is at the Washington Headquarters Museum, 
Newburgh, New York. It is illustrated in the Sketchbook 76; 
and its construction, as well as, the speculation of the 
author concerning other hunting shirts, is described as 
follows.
The body was made of one piece of fine linen, folded 
at the shoulder with an opening cut fro the neck and 
front-gussets were set in the neck opening and the 
opening was then gathered to fit the collar-the cape 
was then stitched on where the collar joins the 
body-buttons were cloth covered wood, or of bone or 
pewter. Fringe was made by cutting strips of linen,
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then by pulling out the threads on both edges, and 
folding the strip down the center-fringe was added 
or omitted to suit the wearer or any regulations in 
force. The pleated or plain sleeve was made with a 
gusset set in the underside where it joins the body.
The cuff is sewn inside the sleeve and has a button 
and loop-descriptions seem to indicate the shirts 
were made in many colors-white, black, blue, brown, 
grey, ash, and shades of green (Klinger 1967:17).
The pleated sleeves may be an exception rather than a rule.
It is doubtful if the Virginians used such an elaborate
version of this garment. This example does, however,
present all the components of a frock.
Small Clothes
Waistcoat (Figure 2d.)
The waistcoat worn by the Virginia soldier, like the
shirt, probably did not differ from the civilian garment.
Although waistcoats were made of linen, the records indicate 
that the waistcoat issued to the Virginia troops were made 
of wool, either broadcloth or flannel. The use of wool 
would provide warmth if wool coats were not available and
the men used hunting shirts as an outer garment.
Deserter descriptions include waistcoats of a variety 
of colors. However, the Philadelphia Store Records and 
descriptions of deserters from units that would have been 





standard color of issue. The Philadelphia records also list 
vest buttons as being issued. This could mean the 
waistcoats were issued without buttons or that the linen and 
wool material that was issued was being made up into 
waistcoats.
An illustration of a waistcoat based upon surviving 
specimens of garments worn by Generals Washington and 
Gansevoort appears in Sketchbook 76. It is close fitting to 
the body. It is constructed of four main pieces, two make 
up the back, and two the front. There are pocket flaps on 
each side which may or may not have been functional. A 
regular soldier's waistcoat was not as fine as that of an 
officer. The waistcoat closed with approximately a dozen 
buttons (Klinger 1967:7-8).
Breeches, Overalls, Trousers (Figure 2a., 2b., 2c.)
The Virginia soldier undoubtedly had access to, and 
used, trousers and overalls during the Revolution, but the 
documentation would suggest that breeches were, by far, the 
most common garment below the waist. They were manufactured 
from linen, buckskin, and wool (both broadcloth and 
flannel). The colors included red, brown, buff, green, arid 
blue.
The style of the breeches was that of civilian 
garments. Trousers and overalls were similar in
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construction except the terminated at the foot rather than 
the knee. Each of these garments had a wide waistband that 
buttoned in front and was adjusted to fit using laces in the 
rear which were tied. There was a wide flap, or fall, in 
the front which buttoned at the waistband. The seat was 
full, the extra material allowed the wearer to sit as these 
garments were tight fitted at the knee. This was 
accomplished by buckling a knee band, which was part of the 
leg of the breeches. The trousers and overalls were held at 
this point by a leg garter which consisted of a separate 
narrow leather band, buckled over the material.
Trousers and overalls continued to the ankle. The 
trousers terminated at this point with a simple hem. The 
overalls reached to the shoe and a tongue or flap was added 
to the front to cover the shoe. A strap ran under the arch 
of the shoe to hold the leg of the overalls down and they 
were fastened tight to the ankle with buttons along the 
outside seam. This, in effect, replaced the full or half 
gaiters protecting the leg and preventing stones and other 
matter from getting into the shoe.
Shirt (Figure 3a.)
The shirt was not unlike the basic hunting shirt 
discussed elsewhere, the major difference was the weight of 
the fabric. White or natural color linen, plain or checked, 








arms, collar, cuffs, and gussets. Intended to be rather
loose fitting except at the collar and cuffs, the
construction was simple.
The main body of the early shirt is made from one 
length of fabric. Sometimes the warp direction of 
this piece runs vertically up the front, over the 
shoulders, and down the back; there is no shoulder 
seam-only a fold-and the lower edge of the shirt 
must be hemmed. There are two side seams where the 
fabric is joined from the underarm region to the 
hem. Not infrequently both edges of the fabric are 
selvage, indicating that the material was utilized 
at full loom width. In many shirts a single piece 
of material was wrapped horizontally around the 
body. With this arrangement there is generally but 
one seam, the lower edge often is a selvage, and a 
shoulder seam is necessary. With either method of 
construction, a reinforcement of extra fabric from 
the sleeve top to collar was sometime used.
To this basic length of fabric forming the shirt 
body were attached two additional rectangles for the 
sleeves, smaller rectangles for the collar and cuffs 
and a full compliment of gussets which, with 
strategically placed gathers, provided ease and fit. 
This basic format readily lent itself to variations 
in size, length, fullness, fabric type and width, 
and embellishment as dictated by the size and 
personal preference of the wearer, its intended use 
for work or dress, slight local variations, and 
availability of fabric. Not all the characteristics 
found in the Pennsylvania shirts described are by 
any means exclusive to this state or even to America 
(Gerhret 1976:99).
Although the description above is of shirts found in 
Pennsylvania, it would probably be applicable to most 
eighteenth century shirts. Nor is there any evidence that 
the shirts used by Virginia soldiers would have been other 
than this type, the material and design of which was taken 
from the civilian traditions. The term "soldier shirt" or 
"officer shirt" found in the Philadelphia Store Record 
probably indicates the quality of the fabric and the use of
embellishments rather than a different style.
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Headgear (Figure 4)
The headgear worn by the Virginia soldier can be 
divided into three types: hats, caps, and woolen knitted 
caps. The hat is constructed from felt and has a brim of 
varying width which extends the entire circumference of the 
crown. The cap resembles our modern baseball cap. It is of 
leather with a brim over the eyes. Also, these may have 
been made from a felt hat with brim removed except in the 
front. The woolen knitted cap is similar to the modern 
winter stocking cap except that it was longer.
The infantry soldiers hat of the eighteenth century was 
fashioned from felt with a low, rounded crown. The brim was 
cut to a specific width and turned up, or cocked, according 
to regulation or personal preference. The style most 
frequently found in the military of the period was a hat 
turned up on three sides (Figure 4a.), not unlike the 
tricorn, or three cornered hat, common to the civilian 
population. The major difference is that the military 
cocked hat was turned up slightly off center which brought 
the front point of the hat over the left eye rather than the 
nose of the wearer, which was the case with its civilian 
counterpart (Neumann and Kravic 1975:136). This was done to 





soldier's left shoulder. The military drill of the period 
called for the musket to be carried on the left shoulder 
which would have caused the firearm to hit the civilian 
tricorn. The military cocked hat was decorated with a 
button and loop on the left side, a cord that ran around the 
base of the brim, and a cockade. The edges of the brim were 
covered, or bound, with a narrow piece of cloth.
There were other treatments of the soldier's hat. One
method, apparently popular with Virginians early in the war,
was the round hat (Figure 4b.). This variety is illustrated
by an order to the 6th Virginia Regiment.
Both officers and soldiers to have hats cut round 
and bound in black; the brims of their hats to be 2 
inches deep and cocked on one side, with a button 
and loop and cockades, which is to be worn on the 
left (Goodwin 1962:11).
Another treatment which appears in at least one 
deserter description is the flopped or flapped hat, which is 
simply a hat with the brim left wide and unturned (Neumann 
and Kravic 1975:138).
The basic hat may have had the brim cut off at the 
bottom edge of the crown except for a few inches in front. 
The remaining brim, of what was then a cap, might now be 
turned up and hooked to the crown. Common terms for this 
cap were jockey or light infantryman's cap (Neumann and 
Kravic 1975:142). This variety of cap was also manufactured 
from leather with a brim perpendicular to the crown (Figure 
4c.). Another piece of leather, called a shield, mounted 
vertically in front of the crown, was fixed to the cap at
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the junction of the crown and brim. The shield may have 
been painted along the edge and had the regimental number in 
Roman numerals. Some varieties have decorative metal 
chains, horsehair plumes, and/or a cloth band, or turban, 
tied around the crown (Neumann and Kravic 1975:137).
This hat was usually reserved for elite troops such as 
light infantry. It was worn by the Virginians attached to 
the light infantry corps of the Continental Army during the 
campaign of 1779. The Virginian's cap did not have a hair 
plume (Gamble 1892:250). Any other decoration would be 
speculation.
The Philadelphia Public Store distributed woolen single 
and double caps to the Virginia Line in the winter of 
1778-1779 (PPS 1778-1779:9-25). These were probably knitted 
stocking caps. The double cap was a tube which tapered to 
both ends and then one end was inserted into the other 
providing a double thickness of material (Hanson 1981:11).
Gaiters
Gaiters were part of the early uniform and probably 
used throughout the war. They were made from thick woolen 
cloth and heavy Linen. There were two types of gaiters: 
full gaiters and half gaiters or spatterdashes. The full 
gaiters extended above the knee and the half gaiters above 
the ankle to approximately the bottom of the calf.
Both types of gaiters buttoned their full length on the
110
outside of the leg. They had a tongue of material inserted 
at the front to cover the front of the shoe. A strap 
attached to each side at the bottom ran under the arch of 
the shoe. The full gaiters were bound below the knee with a 
garter, usually a leather strap with a buckle. Possibly a 
strip of cloth might be used for this purpose. Although the 
gaiter is often compared to the leggings worn by Native 
Americans, the garment was common to the European soldier of 
the period and was probably used by civilians whose work 
would cause unusual wear on breeches, stockings, and shoes.
Shoes (Figure 3c.)
The lack of shoes was a continuous problem for the
Continental Army. Obviously, this item of equipment would
have received the most wear. The problem was one of quality
as well as quantity and is summed up in this statement by
General Washington on March 6, 1778:
... we have suffered more for want of shoes than for 
any other article (and those imported from France 
afford little more than a days wear) (WGW 11,
1934:35).
The problem had not improved since the previous fall. 
The following quote from General Weedon would suggest the 
problem was especially difficult and little was expected 
from the states. The Commander in Chief offers a $10 reward 
for the person who produces the best substitute for shoes
out of raw hides (Weedon 1971:138).
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The soldier's shoe was the common shoe of the period. 
Produced on straight lasts it could be worn on either foot. 
It may have had a square or rounded toe. Although it could 
be modified to tie with laces, a buckle closure was common 
(Neumann and Kravic 1975:122-123). Shoe buckles were issued 
to the Virginians in 1778-1779 (PPS 1778-1779:14-16).
Regimental Coat (Figure lb. )
There are no known example of an American enlisted 
man's coat. Models are constructed from English coats, 
period illustrations, and coats of American officers. As 
the deserter descriptions have shown, Virginians used a wide 
variety of coats, civilian and military. The model 
described is that which was called for in regulations and 
probably was available to the Virginia Line from 1778 to the 
close of the war.
The Virginian's coat was standardized along with the 
rest of the Army in a general order issued on October 2, 
1779. Each state's line regiments were to conform to 
conform to a program calling for blue coats, faced with a 
specific color. Virginia, along with Pennsylvania,
Delaware, and Maryland, was to use red facings. All 
infantry coats were to have white linings and white buttons
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(Goodwin 1962:x).
The coat was constructed to fit close to the body. It 
came to about mid thigh. The body of the coat was wool 
broadcloth; the facings, cuffs, and collar were perhaps of a 
different wool material. The buttons, cast in white metal, 
were used on each facing, the cuffs, and in back. They may 
have been plain or the continental button with the letters 
USA in relief. The coat had pocket flaps on each side.
The collar of the coat turned down. The coat closed in 
front from the collar to mid chest with hooks and eyes. In 
cold weather the facings could be unbuttoned, folded across, 
and buttoned on top of the other facing. Also the cuffs 
could be unbuttoned and turned down in cold weather. The 
tails on each side of the coat were turned back and fastened 
with a hook and eye reinforced by a small heart shape pieces 
of material sewn on the lining. These could be let down in 
cold weather (Klinger 1967:13-15).
OTHER EQUIPMENT
Haversacks (Figure 5a.)
The Williamsburg records shoe material was issued for 
haversacks and it seems likely haversacks were carried by 
the soldiers throughout the war. The haversack served as
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the soldier's pocket. It held personal belongings as well 
as food. The soldier probably never left his haversack out 
of sight for other than a very short period of time. The 
haversack was easily constructed from rectangular piece of 
linen. A fold created a bottom and the sides were sewn to 
create a bag. A small amount of the material remained at 
the top to fold over and cover the opening. The top 
buttoned to the front of the bag. A strap was attached to 
allow the soldier to carry the haversack slung from the 
shoulder (Klinger 1967:30).
Knapsacks (Figure 5b.)
As with haversacks, the soldiers were issued material 
to construct knapsacks. The style of knapsacks carried by 
Virginians is not known. They may have had single bag or 
double bag models. The single bag may have been a larger 
version of the haversack with two straps to allow it to be 
carried from both shoulders. It may have had one strap 
which allowed it to be carried slung diagonally across the 
back. A variation of this model has two bags connected at 
the top which fold against one another, the openings inside. 
This knapsack was slung from a single strap across the 
chest. The side of the knapsack exposed to the weather 





Cartridge Box (Figure 6)
The documentation shows the Virginians used leather 
cartridge boxes and tin cartridge cannisters to carry paper 
ammunition cartridges. Examples of tin cannisters are a 
deep rectangular container measuring 6 1/2" by 3 3/4" by 2 
7/8" (Figure 6b.). It has a hinged lid with edges turned 
down to fit close to the body of the cannister, sealing it 
from the weather. The cannister was slung from a shoulder 
strap that passed through 1 1/2" wide tin loops soldered to 
the sides. The cannister held 3 6 cartridges in layers of 4 
across (Neumann and Kravic 1975:67).
The variety of leather cartridge box used by the 
soldiers of the Virginia Line is not clear. Quite probably 
they used many varieties. The function of the box was to 
protect the paper cartridges from the environment, while 
providing easy access to a soldier during battle. This was 
accomplished using a number of components, all of which were 
seldom were found on boxes used by the Continental Army.
The cartridge box was simply a rectangular pouch which 
held a wooden block with cylindrical holes to hold 
individual paper cartridges. A leather flap was sewn to the 
back of the pouch, crossed over the top and front of the box 
and fastened on the bottom. This flap would be slightly 
wider than the box. A leather or linen strap allowed the 
box to be slung from the shoulder. The leather strap may 
have been two pieces with a buckle (Neumann and Kravic
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1975:66-80).
Various refinements were made to the basic model 
described above. The end pieces of the body of the box were 
made higher to extend above the top of the block. These 
pieces were rounded on the top to conform with the bend of 
the flap as it closed over the box. Often a piece of thin 
leather was sewn to the back of the box inside the outer 
flap (Figure 6a.). This laid on the cartridges for added 
protection. Canvas may have substituted for leather in some 
boxes.
Boxes used late in the war may have had tin trays under 
the blocks which held musket tools and/or extra flints. A 
small flap of leather on the front of the box covered an 
opening which allow access to this tray without removing the 
block. These tool and flints may have also been carried in 







The documentary evidence strongly suggests that the 
soldier of the Virginia Continental Line carried an imported 
French musket from the summer of 1777 until the surrender at 
Charleston in 1780. Therefore, this part of the study will 
concentrate on the French musket. The English musket and 
American muskets, which were used by Virginians, will be 
discussed for comparative purposes.
All military muskets used in the American Revolution 
were essentially the same. They were, by modern standards, 
long and heavy. They were fired by means of a flintlock 
ignition system, the barrels were smoothbore, and they 
loaded from the muzzle.
These arms saw minor changes throughout the eighteenth 
century. The changes may have had some affect on 
reliability, operation, and maintenance. They could not, 
however, be thought of as evolutionary in firearm 
technology.
The French musket saw many more changes than the 
British arm. Authorities recognize two models of British 
muskets during a period in which there are nine models of 
French muskets (Neumann 1967:34-35). Although any or all of 
these French models may have been part of those supplied to
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the Continental Army, it is believed the bulk of those 
imported were models of 17 63, 17 66, and 17 68 (Peterson 
1968:38, Neumann 1967:35).
The model 17 63 will serve as an example of the French 
musket. It must be noted that individual specimens may or 
may not be true to the ideal. Repairs may have included 
parts from other models altered to fit or parts manufactured 
by the soldiers, army artificers, or civilian gunsmiths. 
Repairs or personal modification may have changed a musket 
substantially from original specifications.
The M1763 musket had a 44 1/2-inch barrel with a .69 
caliber bore. It was held to the wooden stock with three 
bands. The lock had a flat cock and plate 6 3/4 inches 
long. The bands, lock, and other metal parts were iron.
One example of the M1763 musket is 59 3/4 inches 
overall. The lock measures 6 3/4 inches by 1 3/4 inches.
The trigger guard is 12 5/8 inches and the butt tang, 2 1/2 
inches. It weighs 9.3 lbs. This musket has CHARLEVILLE 
engraved and US stamped or engraved on the lock plate 
(Neumann 1967:72). Charleville was one of three French 
armories. The others were Maubeuge and St. Etienne. The 
author of this study has seen only one musket marked St. 
Etienne and many marked Charleville. Charleville has become 
a common name for any French musket of the Revolutionary 
war. The US marking establishes the musket as property of 
the United States.
Sling swivels were mounted on lugs on the middle barrel
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band and in front of the bow of the trigger guard. A sight 
was fixed on the front barrel band. The ramrod was iron 
(Neumann 1967:72).
The musket carried by the British soldier, and some 
Americans, was functionally identical to the French. There 
are, however, differences which are readily visible. These 
differences may well have affected individual perceptions of 
the muskets quality.
The English military musket is commonly known as the 
Brown Bess, although it is questioned as to whether this 
term was used before or during the war (Brown 1980:231). 
There are two models of the Bess used by the British army 
during the American Revolution: the Long Land pattern or 
first model, and the Short Land pattern or second model.
The Long Land pattern appeared in the early 17 2 0's. It
had a 46-inch barrel which was attached to the wooden stock 
with pins. The pins passed through the stock and engaged 
lugs on the bottom of the barrel. The earliest muskets had 
iron furniture, a hold over from the Queen Anne muskets. 
Brass replaced iron as the latter was used up. By 1730 
brass was the standard (Neumann 1967:33).
A 42-inch barrel, the main characteristic of the Short 
Land pattern musket, appeared in 1722, although it was not 
officially accepted until the 1740's. The Short Land 
pattern was formally adopted in 1768. The Long Land 
pattern, however, continued to be produced until 1790 
(Neumann 1967:33-34).
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Differences between the French and English muskets 
included the pinning of the barrel on the English weapon. 
This required that more wood be left in the stock than was 
the case with the banding technique on the French gun. This 
accounted in part for the English arm being heavier than the 
French. The M17 63, previously noted, weighed 9.3 lbs. This 
is a heavy example. Other muskets, including a M17 54,
M1746—1763, M1766, and M1768, weighed 8.5, 8.8, 8.0, and 8.4 
lbs. respectively. Examples of English muskets weighed 
between 9.4 and 10.5 lbs. for the Long Land pattern and 10.0 
to 10.8 lbs. for the Short Land pattern (Neumann 1967:58-62, 
70-74). Weight is a characteristic which would be readily 
noticeable and important to the soldier. Many soldiers in 
the Continental Army, Virginians included, had experience 
with both weapons (Peterson 1968:27, 36-38). This
experience was to contribute to the selection and production 
of American military arms in the future.
It might also be assumed that the iron furniture of the 
French arm was preferred to the brass found on the English 
gun. The maintenance of the musket in the field was the 
responsibility of the soldier. This included the cleaning of 
the metal parts. Both iron and brass are susceptible to 
surface corrosion. The shine of brass which would indicate 
a well maintained arm is not possible on iron. Therefore, 
the soldier with an iron mounted gun would not have to 
produce the very visible results required of a brass mounted 
gun.
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American produced muskets tend to resemble the English 
models. This was, undoubtedly, a result of tradition and 
the availability of parts scavenged from obsolete and broken 
muskets which may have been in local magazines or left over 
from the French and Indian War. Although the American 
product resembles its English counterpart, there are 
significant differences.
A small sample of seven American made muskets 
attributed to a period 1775-1783, support the points stated 
above. Five of the examples have bore diameters smaller 
than the English muskets whose bore was approximately .75 
caliber. Four of these muskets are .71-.74 caliber and one 
is .67. The musket with the .67 caliber bore is closer to 
the bore size of a French musket than an English. This 
weapon also has a French style side plate and butt plate, 
which, like the rest of the furniture, are brass. It is 
lighter, 9.3 lbs., than the other examples which range up to 
11.0 lbs. The lock is an English style. This musket, 
although thought to be manufactured during the revolution, 
is marked " 6 V. SPOTSYLVANIA", a marking system attributed 
to the 1790's (Neumann 1967:108-112).
The reasons for the differences in these weapons from 
the English arms which provided the pattern, might well be 
just a case of working with the available resources.
However, the smaller bore size would have allowed for 
economy in the amount of lead used in ammunition. This 
economy is thought to be important to the gunsmiths of
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Pennsylvania (see Rifles below). Perhaps it was a 
reflection of a break with tradition.
Rifles
It is clear from the documentation that early in the 
war many Virginia soldiers, including those in line 
regiments, were armed with rifles. There is no evidence to 
suggest that rifles were issued in any quantity to these 
men, therefore,the weapons were probably personal property. 
There was no standard model as was the case with the 
muskets. This weapon would have been produced in the region 
of the soldier's home. This would have caused a wide 
variety of rifles to have been used in the Virginia Line.
The variety of rifles would be due to Virginia being 
geographically between two regional traditions in gun 
making. These traditions, Pennsylvania and Southern, or 
Southern Mountain, exhibit very different characteristics in 
their product. Virginians would have been exposed to one or 
both of these styles.
The Pennsylvania rifles have been well documented as a 
combination of the gun making traditions of Central Europe, 
brought to Pennsylvania in the early eighteenth century by 
German immigrants, and the adaptation to the environment of 
North America. The rifle in Europe, commonly known as the 
Jaeger, was a short, heavy weapon with a 28 inch barrel of
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.60 to .70 caliber. The thick wood stock had a patchbox 
with a sliding wood cover. The furniture was brass (Neumann 
1967:134).
By the time of the American Revolution this tradition, 
as practiced in Pennsylvania, had produced a very different 
variation of this weapon. For greater accuracy, the short 
barrel had been lengthened (to consume all the powder charge 
and provide a longer aiming span); for economy of lead and 
lighter weight, the bore was reduced; for a flatter 
trajectory, a higher ratio of powder to ball evolved; and 
for better balance in carrying through rough country, the 
stock was reshaped. By 1770, the American rifle destined 
for use in the Revolutionary War had acquired many of its 
basic characteristics: a barrel length over 40 inches; a 
bore averaging .40 to .60 caliber (with seven or eight 
grooves); a long thin stock extending to the muzzle; a 
gooseneck cock; an elevated handgrip on the rear of the 
triggerguard; raised carving around the fittings; and a 
patchbox with a wooden, iron, or simple brass cover (Neumann 
1967:134).
An example of this type of weapon was used by Nicholas 
Allen of Virginia who served under Daniel Morgan. The 
sideplate is engraved "NA 1770". The builder is thought to 
be Jacobus Scout, a Pennsylvania gunsmith. The furniture is 
brass and the patchbox appears to be hinged on the bottom. 
Its overall length is 4 feet 11 inches (Moore 1967:177).
This weapon closely conforms with the description quoted
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above.
The Southern rifle is quite different. Although it 
shares basic characteristics, length and profile shape, it 
lacks the refinements of the Pennsylvania gun. There is 
little, if any, carving, and it is limited in most cases to 
a cheek piece. The furniture is iron and these parts were 
limited to a buttplate and ramrod pipes, with the rear 
ramrod pipe often omitted. A simple grease hole was drilled 
or cut into the stock in place of a patchbox. This held a 
thick lubricant to moisten patches.
An example of this type of weapon, with some 
interesting variations is attributed to a Virginia gunsmith 
active before and during the war. The rifle, marked "M. 
SHEETS" on the barrel, is 64 3/4 inches overall with a 49- 
inch, .55 caliber, octagonal to round barrel. The stock has 
no cheekpiece, grease hole, or any other carving. This gun 
has brass furniture, not usual on a Southern rifle, although 
it conforms with the simple style of these weapons and does 
not have an elevated handgrip on the trigger guard (Neumann 
1967:146).
Virginia bordered both the Pennsylvania and Southern 
gun making traditions. The rifle carried by the Virginia 
soldier was probably purchased near his home and was of the 
style of that region. The Nicholas Allen rifle, described 
above, would support this contention. Many of Morgan's men 
came from the area of his home near Winchester, Virginia. 
This northern Virginia location would have made Pennsylvania
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The opening scene of the motion picture Patton has 
General George S. Patton, Jr., portrayed by actor George C. 
Scott, giving a speech to troops training under him in 
Louisiana at the beginning of World War II. Standing in 
front of an American flag, which fills the entire 
background, the character, in ornate military uniform, tells 
the men that America loves a fight, that "all real Americans 
love the sting of battle" (Twentieth Century Fox 1969).
Although he was known for his theatrics, General Patton 
may have believed that Americans love war. However, an 
overall review of American history would cause this idea to 
be questioned. Furthermore, if institutionalized militarism 
can be directly related to a society who accepts war as 
normal activity, then the absence of militarism in the 
cultural make-up of the United States would also make a 
statement concerning American attitude toward war.
The specific hypothesis of this study is to determine 
if the equipment used by a soldier, in this case the 
Virginia soldier in the American Revolution, reflected the 
attitude of his society toward war. The examples of
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equipment provided in this study, as well as political 
action concerning the organization and limitations of the 
military during and after the war, strongly suggest a close 
positive relationship.
The effort to prevent the establishment of militarism
in the United States was begun during the founding years of
the nation and can be directly related to the experiences of
the American Revolution. The Americans had gained
independence from Great Britain. The military forces of
Britain, and those of its German mercenary allies, were
products of a militaristic system. The leaders of the new
nation realized that a military system was necessary and
that the design of this system could prevent the
establishment of militarism.
In the system later developed within the framework 
of the Constitution, many details also stood out in 
sharp contrast to the Continental system and even 
the British system: (1) although Congress was given
unlimited power to raise armies, the principal 
reliance for man power was long placed on the 
militia of the states, with its democratic relations 
between officers and men; (2) the standing army, 
though added to the militia, was kept small, even 
minute at times, until the end of the nineteenth 
century; (3) training for officers was finally 
provided by the establishment of the military 
academy at West Point, but this provision was 
countered in a manner to prevent the rise of a 
hereditary officer caste-by the distribution of 
cadetships among the states and congressional 
districts through the agency of political senators 
and representatives; (4) the concentration of army 
discipline was upon immediate usefulness in civil 
disturbances and wars rather than displays and 
ceremonials, as often in Europe: the army was 
restricted by what was considered usefulness, which 
included the guarding of the frontier and public 
works; and (5) reliance was placed upon volunteers 
for the standing army in time of peace and hence
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having foot-loose youths usually from the lower 
strata of society.
In other words, the American system at the outset 
was a military system, not a militaristic system.
It conceived of the army as an agency of civil 
power, to be organized and disciplined with that 
purpose in view, and not as an end in itself (Vagts 
1959:103) .
The American military system, as described above, was 
formed in direct relation to its function. It is not a 
system that suggests an advocacy of war. The material 
culture documented and illustrated in this study was part of 
the conflict in which this military system was born. The 
equipment of the soldier of the Virginia Line exhibits 
characteristics that suggest, like the military system that 
was to develop, function dominated form.
The tools of war used by the Virginians in the American 
Revolution as a whole, and singularly in most cases, suggest 
concern for function and simplicity. The design seems 
oriented to the task and avoids the decorative, 
nonfunctional attributes, common to the equipment of the 
European soldier, a product of a militaristic system.
The individual pieces of equipment used by the 
Virginians were a result of the limited resources of the 
state, as well as, the pressing need. Yet, although the 
equipment was a result of these factors, much of the postwar 
equipment retained similar, if not identical, 
characteristics.
This is best seen in the main tool of war: the weapon. 
In this case the weapon most familiar to the Virginian was
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the imported French musket. The M17 63 musket became the 
model for the American M1795, the first firearm developed 
and produced by the American military. This style is seen 
in American military arms throughout the nineteenth century 
with technological advances such as the caplock, rifled 
barrel, graduated rear sight, and breech loading mechanism, 
being incorporated into the basic design. Although the 
operation of the M1763 musket was identical to other weapons 
of this period, it had many features that suggest that 
function dictated the form.
The barrel of the musket was secured to the stock with 
bands rather than pins that were used on the English gun. 
This system allowed for less wood in the musket's forestock. 
The bands could be removed by simply sliding them over the 
muzzle. Then, with the removal of a screw in the tang of
the breechplug and one of the lock screws, the barrel could
be removed from the stock. This operation could be
accomplished in the field.
The same operation performed on the English musket 
required the removal of the barrel pins as well as the screw 
in the tang of the breechplug. The pins had to be brought 
above the surface of the stock to be withdrawn. This 
required that a punch and mallet be used with some care to 
drive one end of the pin to the surface. This operation was 
best done at an armory by a skilled workman. The removal 
and inserting of these pins had the potential to cause 
damage to the stock.
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The M1763 musket had a reinforced, double throated, 
cock (Figure 8d.). The cock was subject to repeated abuse 
when it struck the frizzen. The reinforced design helped 
resist damage. The screw which tightened the jaws of the 
cock to hold the flint had a hole at its head, below, and 
perpendicular to the slot for the use of a screwdriver.
This allowed the jaws to be tightened with any metal rod 
that would fit in the hole, if a screwdriver was not 
available. This might well speed up the changing of a flint 
in battle. The English musket need a screwdriver to tighten 
the jaws of the cock. The cock was S-shaped (Figure 7e.), 
thin and delicate in comparison to the French.
The relative ease of maintaining the iron furniture of 
the French musket compared to the brass of the English was 
discussed earlier. The design of this furniture also 
illustrates the functional simplicity of the French arm.
The English weapon had a decorative serpentine side plate 
(Figure 7a.), finials on the trigger guard (Figure 7c.), and 
a long tang on the butt plate (Figure 7d.). The French 
musket had a simple, flat side plate (Figure 8a.) and 
rounded ends on the trigger guard (Figure 8c.) and butt 
plate Figure 8b.). Also, the French musket did not require 
ramrod pipes, as the barrel bands served this function. The 
English gun had an escutcheon plate (Figure 7b.) on the top 
of the wrist portion of the stock. This part may have had 
identification numbers but was otherwise decorative.











A smaller bore used a smaller ball. This allowed more 
balls to be produced from each pound of lead. The smaller 
ball and bore would allow less powder to be used. The 
lighter weight of the individual cartridge would mean the 
soldier would have less weight to carry, an important factor 
on the march, or could carry more ammunition into battle, an 
important factor in this situation.
The comparisons of these weapons supports the 
assumption that the French design was functionally superior 
to its English counterpart. The selection of this weapon as 
a model for American produced weapons might be based on this 
reason. Another reason might be an anti-British, pro-French 
attitude following the war. It must be noted, however, that 
the first official American musket, M1795, was adopted 
during a Federalist, pro-British national administration and 
at the time of a quasi-war with France. Also, with the 
adoption of the French design, the English tradition, 
followed during the war in American musket manufacturing, 
was completely abandoned. It appears functional concerns 
played a pivotal role in the selection of this design. The 
avoidance of decorative elements further suggest a 
nonmilitaristic attitude.
Lack of decoration and functional considerations are 
also apparent in the clothing of the Virginia soldier. As 
with the musket, clothing was subject to the state's 
resources as applied to a pressing need. Yet, the style of
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clothing used in the Revolution, although a result of 
shortages and improvisation, was retained in many cases 
through the War of 1812 and beyond.
The hunting shirt is covered extensively in this study. 
Virginia provided this garment in abundance to its troops.
It was constructed from durable linen from a simple pattern 
that did not require expert tailoring. The basic garment 
(Figure la.) could have a cape, attached to the collar, 
which laid over the shoulders providing a double layer of 
fabric for added protection from the weather. If wet it 
would dry faster than a wool uniform coat. Contrasting 
colors could be incorporated into the collar and cuffs for 
identification of the wearers regiment, rank, and special 
skill, such as a musician. Though it lacked the warmth of a 
wool coat, a wool waistcoat worn underneath would compensate 
somewhat for this deficiency. The hunting shirt was 
adequate for the weather encountered during the regular 
campaign season, spring through autumn. Winter limited army 
activities, lessening problems due to the lack of a wool 
coat. It probably continued to be used by the civilian 
population after the war, particularly on the frontier, and 
reappeared as a military garment in the War of 1812.
The wool uniform coats worn by Virginians (Figure lb.) 
were probably of the same basic tailoring pattern used for 
uniform coats in Europe. Yet they lacked the decorative 
elements common to British soldier's coats. The decorations 
common to the British coat included binding around the
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button holes on the collar, lapels, and cuffs. The material 
used, commonly called lace, was woven with a distinctive 
pattern unique to each regiment. There is no evidence of 
the use of lace on Virginia regimental coats.
Another decorative treatment employed by the British 
was the use of shoulder wings. These were pieces of 
material that covered the outside of the shoulder and upper 
arm. The wings were also laced. Wings were used to identify 
the regiments elite companies (Mollo 1975:190, plate 114). 
There is no evidence of wings being used on Virginia 
regimental coats.
The small clothes, breeches and waistcoats, and shirts 
did not differ from the same articles of civilian clothing. 
This would support a nonmilitaristic attitude. The 
exception in this group of clothing is the use of military 
overalls (Figure 2b.), which were not worn by the civilian 
population. The overalls provided, in a single garment, the 
protection to the lower part of the body that required 
breeches and a pair of gaiters. This functional item of 
clothing continued in use in the American military through 
the War of 1812.
Other equipment carried by the Virginia soldier 
included the simple haversack, knapsack, canteen, and 
bayonet in a leather scabbard. These items may have had a 
painted regimental identification but no other decorative 
elements. This would also be true of the European soldier's 
equipment, with the exception of the knapsack made with goat
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skin with the hair remaining used by some British troops.
The hair may have provide protection, and therefore be 
functional, but such a knapsack would have also been very 
visible against a red coat, part of a military image.
The final piece of equipment to be examined is the 
cartridge box. The sources examined for this study did not 
reveal what particular model of leather cartridge box was 
carried by the Virginian. It is likely he used a variety of 
models during the war. There is no evidence that any of 
these boxes had decorative elements. This was not the case 
with the European troops.
British cartridge boxes had a plate which differed by 
regiment. This brass plate was fastened to the outer flap 
of the box. It bore the royal cipher and the number of the 
regiment. Many of these boxes also had another plate fixed 
to the shoulder belt. It was also marked and was worn in 
the middle of the chest at the point where this belt crossed 
with the sling, or belt, of the bayonet scabbard (Neumann 
and Kravic 1975:224-226).
The documentation does confirm that the Virginia troops 
carried a tin cartridge cannister (Figure 6b.). This simple 
rectangular container carried thirty-six cartridges and was 
waterproof. These features were not met by any leather box. 
Although it may have presented problems for the soldier in 
handling the cartridges, the protection it provided solved 
an ongoing problem caused by poor quality leather boxes.
The equipment used by the soldier of the Virginia Line
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consistently demonstrates that form was subservient to 
function. This fact is reinforced when the Virginian's 
equipment is compared to the equipment of British and German 
troops. This functional simplicity was carried on after the 
war and it can be argued it continues to the present.
The points made earlier concerning the development of 
the American military system in contrast to the the European 
militaristic system depict a widely different attitude on 
the part of these societies toward the military. The 
military equipment of these societies is, likewise, 
different. The Virginian's equipment is just a tool for the 
job in comparison to the decorative items of the European 
that suggest image is as important as results. The relation 
between the system and its associated material culture seems 
evident.
The question of whether a society with a militaristic 
system views war differently than one with a military system 
remains. Although a definitive answer to this question is 
beyond the scope of this study, it was stated at the 
beginning, for the purposes of this study, there is a 
difference. The militaristic society sees war in a more 
favorable light than does a nonmilitaristic society.
The political relationship of the military and the 
civilian authority as arising from the experiences of the 
American Revolution has been briefly reviewed and compared 
to the the material culture that was used in that conflict. 
It appears that the military equipment demonstrates dominant
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functional, nondecorative attributes that are consistent 
with the development of a nonmilitaristic, American military 
system. This strongly suggests the validity of the 
hypothesis of this study; that the military material culture 
of the soldier does represent the attitude of his society 
toward war.
If the military system of the United States is 
nonmilitaristic, and comparisons to other societies would 
indicate this is true, and if nonmilitaristic societies do 
view war in negative terms, then the opinion attributed to 
General Patton is incorrect. Americans do not love war. 
Furthermore history would suggest that the United States has 
avoided war and when involved has taken action to end the 
conflict as efficiently and quickly as possible. The 
American material culture of war speaks to this efficiency 
and is a strong indication of this society's negative 
attitude toward war.
APPENDIX
THE SERVICE OF THE VIRGINIA CONTINENTAL LINE
The service of Virginians in the Continental Army spans 
most of the American Revolution. At the beginning the 
Virginians were slow to move north, due primarily to lack of 
equipment. Through the middle years, 1777-1779, Virginians 
were a major part of the army. In the closing years of the 
war, 1780-1783, Virginia's manpower contributions were 
limited to the Southern Department as the bulk of the 
veteran Virginia Continental Line surrendered at Charleston 
in 1780.
The war effort in Virginia began as all threats of this 
type were handled at this time: the militia was called into 
service. This threat, however, was beyond the ability of 
independent county based militia. As it became apparent 
that the conflict was going to become general in nature, 
Virginia took action to institute a regular military 
establishment.
Between July and December of 1775, Virginia raised, on 
paper, nine regiments of infantry. Two were completed by 
November, five were ready by February 177 6, and two in the 
Spring (Sellers 1978:2). Threats within the state by the 
Royal Governor, Lord Dunmore, and the threat to Charleston, 
South Carolina, to which the 8th Virginia responded, delayed
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the movement of the Line Regiments to join Washington 
(Sellers 1978:3-5).
The threat to Charleston was repulsed in the summer of 
1776. Dunmore left Virginia after the defeat of his forces 
at Great Bridge in December of 1775. This ended threats to 
the region and the Virginia Line was able to march north.
The British had been driven from Boston. They
regrouped and in the late summer of 177 6 they attacked New
York City. The waterways in this area were key to the 
defense and the were dominated by the British navy. 
Washington's army fought a series of unsuccessful battles in 
defense of the city. The 3rd Virginia Regiment arrived in 
time to take part in the Battle of Harlem Heights (Sellers 
1978:6-7). The 1st Virginia joined the army as it left this 
area and marched into New Jersey (Sellers 1978:9).
On November 23, 177 6, the 4th, 5th, and 6th Virginia
Regiments joined the army at New Brunswick, New Jersey
(Sellers 1978:11). These three regiments formed a brigade 
of 745 men (Lesser 1976:40). The other Virginia Regiments, 
brigaded under the command of General George Weedon, 
mustered only 683 (Lesser 1976:37). These two understrength 
brigades, totaling 1428 men, represented one-third of 
Washington's army.
This was the low point of the war. Washington was 
under pressure to revive morale, and this resulted in his 
attack on the Hessian post at Trenton, New Jersey, on 
Christmas Day, 177 6. The army returns dated December 22,
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177 6 show that The army had 6104 men fit for duty.
Virginians in this figure amounted to 915. 764 others are
listed as sick, 692 of these men from the 1st and 3rd 
Virginia (Lesser 1976:43).
The Virginians were among the first to cross the 
Delaware River. Stephen's Brigade, 4th, 5th, and 6th 
Virginia, was given the task of securing the landing on the 
New Jersey shore. This brigade then led General Greene's 
column on the Pennington road. The other Virginia troops 
were in the main column (Ward 1952, 294).
The attack on Trenton and the raid on Princeton which 
followed were, in terms of numbers of troops, small events. 
They were, however, important. The morale problem which led 
to the actions was improved. It gave the Americans a 
success in tactical maneuver against professional European 
soldiers. Also, it may have had an affect on aid from 
France and others.
In January of 1777, the 2nd and 7th Virginia were 
ordered to march north. They experience delays due to 
sickness and reached the army in April. The 8th Virginia, 
arrived in late March. The 13th Virginia had been ordered 
north, but was then assigned to the garrison at Fort Pitt 
(Sellers 1978:22-24).
The campaign of 1777 was a turning point in the war. 
Washington's forces did not have the numbers or ability to 
conduct an offensive campaign and, therefore, had to follow 
the British lead. The British plan was to divide New
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England states from the rest by capturing the Hudson River- 
Lake Champlain line from Canada to New York City. An army, 
under General John Burgoyne, was to move south from Canada 
and eventually link up with the main British force moving 
north from New York City.
There was reason to believe that the British also had 
designs on capturing Philadelphia, which was the meeting 
place of the Continental Congress. Washington was forced to 
deal with both possibilities. The Northern Department was 
reinforced and Washington positioned himself to protect 
Philadelphia, but also to be able to march north if 
required.
There are no army records of troop strength for June 
through September 1777. The May return shows 12 Virginia 
Line regiments (lst-12th) with the army totaling 2512 men 
fit for duty. The Virginia contingent represented more than 
a third of Washington's force of 7363 infantry (Lesser 
1976:46).
The British moved against Philadelphia by sailing from 
New York and up Chesapeake Bay. Washington positioned his 
army along Brandywine Creek which blocked the British line 
of march. On September 11, 1777, the British demonstrated 
against the American center, while Lord Cornwallis led the 
British left to flank the American right. The move was 
successful and the Americans were routed. Complete disaster 
was avoided when General Nathanael Greene established a rear 
guard with the American reserves. This force included
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brigades commanded by Weedon and Muhlenberg, which were 
predominantly made up of Virginians, including the 13th and 
14th Virginia. These regiments, along with the 15th Virginia 
had apparently joined the army after the the May return was 
recorded. These regiments, in their first action, held the 
British force for 45 minutes, until sunset, and then 
executed an orderly withdrawal (Ward 1952:352).
Washington had avoided a decisive defeat, but the way 
to Philadelphia was now open. Washington reorganized and 
followed the British and attacked at Germantown. The attack 
was initially successful and Greene's command, including the 
Virginian's, penetrated the British line beyond support of 
the rest of the army and were cut off. They fought their 
way out with heavy losses. The Virginian's losses, 
including killed, wounded, and missing were 348. The army's 
total was in excess of 1173 (Sellers 1978:39).
Washington, in order to maintain a watch on the 
British, established the army's winter quarters at Valley 
Forge. Enlistments in the Virginia regiments were expiring 
and the state was having trouble meeting its quota. The 
number of companies in each regiment were reduced from ten 
to eight. This would allow for officers to leave the army 
for recruiting duty but did not make up for the manpower 
shortage. The state had no alternative but to release the 
the 1st and 2nd State Line Regiments for service with the 
Continental Army (Sellers 1978:43). The service of the 
units was intended to be within the borders of Virginia.
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The British left Philadelphia and returned to New York 
City in the the spring and summer of 1778. An attack on the 
British rearguard resulted in the indecisive Battle of 
Monmouth, the last major engagement of the war in the middle 
and northern states. The Continental Army, under 
Washington, was to sit and wait until the move south to 
Yorktown, Virginia, in the autumn of 1781.
The manpower problems of the Virginia Line continued.
In September 1778, the Virginia Line was reorganized by 
consolidation of understrength units and the renumbering of 
regiments. The 15 regiments were reduced to eleven (Sellers 
1978:49). This allowed many officers to begin recruiting 
activity.
The recruiting effort included increased bonuses. It 
must have been successful, as comparisons of officers and 
men available for duty increased from 1090 in February 1779 
to 2281 in August of that year, although this increase is 
not entirely attributable to new enlistments (Lesser 
1976:104, 128) .
There were two small actions in 1779. The corps of 
Light Infantry captured the British post at Stony Point, New 
York, and a force under "Light Horse Harry" Lee raided a 
post at Paulus Hook, New Jersey. Virginia troops were 
involved in these actions. The posts were abandoned and 
then reoccupied by the British, so the activity seems to 
have had no strategic value and was probably a result of the 
aggressive personalities of the commanders. The year ended
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with the Virginia Line being ordered south to counter the 
new British plan to separate the southern states, which were 
believed to hold loyalist sentiment.
The final return of Virginia Line serving under 
Washington is in January 1780 and reflects a combination of 
units that first appears in the returns of the the Southern 
Department in April 1780. Before joining the garrison 
defending Charleston, South Carolina, the 1st, 10th, 5th, 
11th, and 7th Regiments had become the 1st Virginia 
Detachment. The 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Regiments had become the 
2nd Virginia Detachment. The 6th and 8th Regiments, and an 
independent command under Nathaniel Gist, became the 3rd 
Virginia Detachment. The 3rd did not join the garrison of 
Charleston (Lesser 1976:148, 160).
Charleston surrendered on May 12, 1780, with over 700
Virginians among the garrison of 5000 (Sellers 1978:62, 67). 
The remaining Virginia unit, the 3rd Detachment, was caught 
near Waxhaws, South Carolina, by British forces and 
overwhelmed. Virginia attempted to reconstitute the Line by 
raising seven new regiments recruited for 18 months.
However, by the time of the Battle of Camden, August 16,
178 0, not one regiment had been completed. The state had 
sent 1400 militia to the Southern Department (Sellers 
1978:62, 67, 69, 70-71).
Virginia did supply Line regiments to the Southern 
Department by February 1781 (Lesser 1976:196). Virginia 
troops remained in this area until the end of the war. They
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took part in the Battle at Guilford Court House which 
eventually led to Cornwallis retreating to Yorktown, 
Virginia. A detachment of Virginians remained with the army 
until mid-March 1783 when the last Virginia soldiers were 
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